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1 - Introduction 
 
In Italy, the so-called lockdown, imposed to restrain (or at least limit) the 
spread of COVID-19, has, in the two seemingly endless months since it 
started, had an overwhelming impact not only on our personal lives, as a 
reminder of the limits of our human condition, but also on domestic 
regulatory frameworks1, as “the emergence generated (not necessarily 
reasonable) law”2. Influential Academics have strongly underlined that, in 
                                                             
* Article peer evaluated. 
 
1 See D. MILANI, Fede e salute al tempo del coronavirus: per un primo bilancio a un mese 
dal lockdown, in OLIR, April 8, 2020 (https://www.olir.it/focus/daniela-milani-fede-e-salute-al-
tempo-del-coronavirus-per-un-primo-bilancio-a-un-mese-dal-lockdown/). 
2 See P. CONSORTI, La libertà religiosa travolta dall’emergenza, in Forum di Quaderni 
Costituzionali (www.forumcostituzionale.it), 2/2020, p. 371. 
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times of deep crisis, like the current global health crisis, the long-term 
“viability of legal institutions” and of “whole legal systems” are put to a 
severe test3. In this period, in fact, during the lockdown period, the 
protection of health - which is at the forefront of this emergency situation - 
is the “leading principle”4 a precondition that orientates all the current 
legal “tragic choices”5.  
Such an unprecedented health emergency also raises a serious 
challenge in terms of fundamental rights and liberties. Several basic rights 
that normally enjoy robust protection under constitutional, supranational, 
and international guarantees, have experienced a devastating 
“suspension”6 for the sake of public health and safety, thus giving rise to a 
vigorous debate concerning whether and to what extent the pandemic 
emergency “justifies limitations on fundamental rights”7. Furthermore, 
concern is increasing about “a radical change” in our value systems, the 
long-term impact of which will extend beyond the time when the 
preservation of health and life is given maximum priority domestically 
and internationally8.  
Religious freedom has been deeply affected by newly imposed 
health measures, and religious communities have experienced 
unparalleled restrictions on their practices, ceremonies and rituals. The 
current tension between competing rights has been severely felt by 
religious communities during religious holidays (Easter, Ramadan, 
Passover). However, these restrictions are not aimed only and specifically 
at religious freedom, but are part of the wider framework of provisions 
that severely restrict freedom of movement and assembly9.  
                                                             
3 See A. RUGGERI, Il coronavirus, la sofferta tenuta dell’assetto istituzionale e la crisi 
palese, ormai endemica, del sistema delle fonti, in Consulta on line (www.giurcost.org), 1/ 
2020, pp. 210-211. 
4 See A. LICASTRO, Il lockdown della libertà di culto pubblico al tempo della pandemia, in 
Consulta on line (www.giurcost.org), 1/2020, p. 229. 
5 See G. CALABRESI, P. BOBBITT, Tragic Choices. The Conflicts Society Confronts in the 
Allocation of Tragically Scarce Resources, 1st ed., W. W. Norton & Co Inc., New York, 1978. 
6 See S. PRISCO, F. ABBONDANTE, I diritti al tempo del coronavirus. Un dialogo, in 
Federalismi.it, Osservatorio emergenza Covid-19 (www.federalismi.it), 1, 2020, p. 6; D. 
MILANI, Fede e salute, cit. 
7 See F. DE STEFANO, La pandemia aggredisce anche il diritto, Intervista a Corrado Caruso, 
Giorgio Lattanzi, Gabriella Luccioli e Massimo Luciani, in Giustizia insieme 
(www.giustiziainsieme.it) (2 April 2020), interview with Corrado Caruso (https://www.giu 
stiziainsieme.it/it/diritto-dell-emergenza-covid-19/961-la-pandemia-aggredisce-anche-il-diritto). 
8 See F. DE STEFANO, La pandemia aggredisce anche il diritto, cit. 
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In this unprecedented period of human history, the effects of which 
will surely have significant long-term consequences, scholars are 
increasingly questioning if the “alarmed”10 government responses 
correctly balanced all the interests at stake. “Public power” should have a 
“mediation” role when a “dialectics of rights” surfaces11: specifically 
whether, and to what degree, government policies, which give “absolute 
prevalence” to salus corporum over salus animarum, are subject to a proper 
cost-benefits analysis and are consistent with the principle of 
proportionality that should lead government actions12. Legal systems 
responded individually, and with differences, to the pandemic emergency, 
ranging from a complete interruption of the collective exercise of religious 
worship (Italy), to a more cautious recognition of forms of religious 
accommodation (United States). As the COVID situation is changing so 
rapidly in the United States, in Italy, and around the world, I clarify that 




2 - Italian legal responses to COVID-19: the Italian constitutional and 
legal framework on religious freedom  
 
In Italy, a complex constitutional structure, particularly in relation to 
religious freedom, played a significant part in the Italian response. The 
response faced the challenge of balancing the principle of mutual 
independence of the Catholic Church and the State, secularism, religious 
pluralism and equal freedom for all religion denominations, the 
recognition of religious denominations’ self-governance in matters of their 
own jurisdiction, freedom of worship, and no discrimination against 
religious organizations. The most distinctive feature of the constitutional 
framework in relation to Church and State is that religious denominations 
can come to bilateral agreements with the State, on matters concerning the 
mutual relationship between the State and a religious denomination. This 
constitutional framework does not lead to an “assimilationist” perception 
of secularism; instead, it connects religious neutrality while promoting 
                                                             
10 See S. FERRARI, In Praise of Pragmatism, in A. FERRARI, S. PASTORELLI (eds.), The 
Burqa Affair Across Europe: Between Public and Private Space, Routledge, London-New York, 
2016, pp. 10-11. 
11 See F. DE STEFANO, La pandemia aggredisce anche il diritto, cit. 
12 See A. LICASTRO, Il lockdown della libertà, cit., 229. 
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safeguarding religious freedom, both individual and collective13. 
However, the only unilateral statute (law no. 1159 of 1929) protecting 
religious freedom now seems completely insufficient to govern a 
profoundly changed institutional framework. An updated statute that 
sought to protect a general religious freedom, and to be more consistent 
with the constitutional framework, would guarantee a more transparent 
implementation of a democratic religious pluralism, thus stemming the 
risk of a privileged recognition of majority narratives14. 
 
 
3 - The suspension of religious assemblies during phase one of the 
pandemic 
 
However, since the outbreak of COVID-19, a sequence of emergency legal 
provisions has pervasively limited religious freedom. At first, provisions 
affecting religious activities only in some areas of Italy, were enforced and 
implemented. On 25 March 2020, the provisions were extended to the 
entire country. All public events throughout Italy, held in any public or 
private space, were suspended, even those of a religious nature, including 
funerals. Places of worship could remain open, provided that measures 
were taken to avoid large gatherings of people, taking into account the 
size and features of the spaces, and guaranteeing that visitors could 
comply with the requirement for interpersonal distance of at least one 
meter15.  
                                                             
13 See S. DOMIANELLO, Aporie e opacità dell’otto per mille: tra interesse pubblico a un 
pluralismo aperto e interessi specifici alla rigidità del mercato religioso, in Stato, Chiese e 
pluralismo confessionale, Rivista telematica (https://www.statoechiese.it), 5/2020, p. 5.  
14 See R. ZACCARIA, S. DOMIANELLO, A. FERRARI, P. FLORIS, R. MAZZOLA (eds.), La legge 
che non c’è. Proposta per una legge sulla libertà religiosa in Italia, il Mulino, Bologna, 2019. 
15 The decree-law of February 23, 2020, n. 6, converted, with modifications (law of 
March 5, 2020, n. 13), authorized the President of the Council of Ministers to adopt urgent 
measures aimed at preventing the spread of the SARS-CoV-26 virus. Later, a series of 
increasingly restrictive provisions, also including religious gatherings, came into force 
(decree of the Prime Minister February 23, 2020; decree of March 1, 2020, decree of March 
4 2020; decree of March 8, 2020; Presidential Decree March 9, 2020). Finally decree-law of 
March 25 2020, no. 19, which provided new "Urgent measures to deal with the 
epidemiological emergency from COVID-19”, came into force. In its preamble, it referred 
to Art. 16 of the Constitution, which “allows limitations on the freedom of movement for 
health reasons”, and emphasized the pressing need to establish measures to limit the 
spread of the virus, relying on the standards of “adequacy and proportionality”. The 
decree authorized the President of the Council to define the measure of the restriction or 
suspension of events of any nature, and of any other form of gathering in public or 
private places, even of a religious nature, as well as that of the suspension of civil and 
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Immediately, many academics criticized the “form”, not the 
“substance”, of these provisions as being in contradiction of the “rule of 
law”, which should govern “conflict between fundamental rights”.16 
However, no one could have ever imagined such an unprecedented threat 
to human life, and the question of how to frame the threat and its impact 
on fundamental human rights in legal terms is controversial. With regard 
to this crucial aspect, some commentators try to compare the current 
public health emergency with a “state of exception” (which is not 
addressed in the constitutional text) and with a state of war (which is 
provided for in Article 78 of the Constitution, which provides for wide-
reaching government powers, but in relation to completely different 
circumstances), and argue that Article 7 of the Code of Civil Protection 
(d.lgs. 1/2018), which identifies emergency situations that require 
exceptional interventions for civil protection, is the proper provision17. The 
necessity to give priority to, and focus the collective interest on health 
allows, during such an unimaginable pandemic crisis such we are facing 
now, pervasive restrictions on the basic right of religious freedom. 
Emergency decrees, which are the legal vehicle through which restrictions 
are imposed, are controversial, but have been used, nevertheless, to meet 
the need to prevent irreparable harmful consequences18. 
When the Italian government issued the emergency measures 
relating to the exercise of religious worship it neither contemplated an 
“illegal disregard” of religious freedom nor was there any intent to 
“subvert” our democratic and pluralistic constitutional framework19. 
These pervasive limitations-the “legitimacy” of which is related to their 
“exceptional” and “temporary” character and the “severe threat” from the 
pandemic-have to be understood within the global framework of the 
precautionary measures imposing social distancing practices, and only 
                                                                                                                                                                       
religious ceremonies, as well as the limitation of entry to places of worship. The 
Presidential Decree of April 1, 2020 extended the deadline of the previous measures and 
the Presidential Decree of April 10, 2020, the provisions of which concern the religious 
matters, and mirror, although with some changes, the provisions of the Presidential 
Decree of March 8, 2020. See A. LICASTRO, Il lockdown della libertà, cit., 230-31. 
16 See F. DE STEFANO, La pandemia aggredisce anche il diritto, cit. (interviews with 
Gabriella Luccioli and Corrado Caruso). 
17 See F. DE STEFANO, La pandemia aggredisce anche il diritto, cit. (interview with 
Giorgio Lattanzi); P. CONSORTI, La libertà religiosa, cit., p. 373. 
18 See. A. FERRARI, Covid-19 e libertà religiosa, cit. 
19 See A. LICASTRO, paper presented at the webinar “La libertà religiosa in Italia ai 
tempi del COVID-19”, 30 April 2020. 
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allowing movement for work, health, or other necessity20. So the 
government had to undertake not only a simple reconciliation between 
two concurrent liberties, but also a more complex balancing of many 
fundamental freedoms with the urgent need to protect public health and 
safety and to do so very quickly21.  
However, the range of the provisions concerning the opening of 
places of worship raised many questions, giving rise to different 
interpretations, ranging from more extensive opening (fully open to the 
public, as an essential service) to more restricted opening (access restricted 
to religious staff)22. 
The question was whether access to places of worship was 
considered as included in “situations of necessity”, thus justifying 
movements of citizens/religious adherents within the borders of the 
municipality where they live. However, the prevailing reading was that 
the provisions only allowed access to places of worship when an 
individual was out on an essential errand (e.g., buying food or medication, 
they could go into a religious space while they were out); so it seems that 
worshipping on its own, to satisfy an intimate faith need, was not 
considered a legitimate reason for leaving home23. The intention of the 
emergency measures was to prevent a misuse of the religious justification 
so as to evade precautionary measures. However, according to some 
scholars, the government seemed to misunderstand freedom of worship, 
seeing it not so much as libertas fidelium, but rather, and mainly, as libertas 
ecclesiae, therefore leading to the need to severely restrict people’s genuine 
freedom to practice their religion24.  
In relation to religious ceremonies, the Department for Civil 
Liberties and Immigration, Central Administration for Religious Affairs’ 
note of 28 March 2020 clarified the real meaning of the Prime Ministerial 
Decree, stating that “celebrations […] are not forbidden, but they can 
                                                             
20 See F. DE STEFANO, La pandemia aggredisce anche il diritto, cit. (interview with 
Corrado Caruso).  
21 See G. CASUSCELLI, paper presented at the webinar “La libertà religiosa in Italia ai 
tempi del COVID-19”, 30 April 2020. 
22 See A. LICASTRO, Il lockdown della libertà, cit., pp. 232-233. 
23 Ministry of the Interior, Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration, Central 
Administration of Affairs of Cults, 27 March 2020 - Questions regarding the containment 
and management of the epidemiological emergency from COVID-19. Needs determined 
by the exercise of the right to freedom of worship. See A. LICASTRO, Il lockdown della 
libertà, cit., p. 233; P. CONSORTI, La libertà religiosa, cit. p. 380. 
24 See A. LICASTRO, Il lockdown della libertà, cit., p. 239. 
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continue to take place without the participation of the people, precisely to 
avoid groupings that could become potential opportunities for contagion”.  
Academics raised concerns about such pervasive restrictions. The 
crucial question was whether the nature of “necessary services” of 
religious practices had been properly assessed or whether, instead, an 
unnecessary equalization of secular and religious activities had been 
performed (putting the latter into the activities that “a person can easily 
forego”)25.  
The government’s attention to the right to exercise religious 
freedom was clear in the provisions that avoided a complete closure of 
places worship, and, in fact, allowed them to remain open, provided that 
safety measures were complied with26. However, such safety measures 
undeniably negatively affected the most common ways of collectively 
exercising religious freedom27. 
The emergency provisions imposed a fundamental restriction on 
the protection of the collective dimension of religious freedom, thereby 
generating great concern about the legitimacy of state imposed limitations 
on the exercise of that freedom. However, it would be better to see such 
restrictions as an exceptional “constriction” of a “specific way” of using 
religious freedom, that is, the “communal form” of religious celebrations, 
because of exceptional circumstances that justify measures to prevent 
dangerous mass gatherings, instead of as an infringement of basic 
constitutional principles28. Unfortunately, given the highly contagious and 
life-threatening nature of the virus, collective and public exercise of 
freedom, including religious freedom, would have unavoidably had a 
devastating cost, thus burdening the entire society29.  
The controversial provisions gave rise to a sharp division between 
commentators. The crucial concern focused on “which” constitutional 
provisions were considered during the decision-making about such 
delicate matter30.  
                                                             
25 See A. LICASTRO, Il lockdown della libertà, cit., p. 237. 
26 See. A. FERRARI, Covid-19 e libertà religiosa, cit. 
27 See. A. FERRARI, Covid-19 e libertà religiosa, cit. 
28 See A. GIANFREDA, Libertà religiosa e culto dei defunti nell’epoca del coronavirus, in 
OLIR, 17 March 2020, https://www.olir.it/focus/anna-gianfreda-liberta-religiosa-e-culto-dei-
defunti-nellepoca-del-coronavirus/ 
29 See. A. FERRARI, Covid-19 e libertà religiosa, cit. 
30 See D. MILANI, Fede e salute, cit. 
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The contentious debate should not underestimate the fact that the 
government had to make a paradigmatic “tragic choice”31 between health 
and religious freedom. The element of religious freedom involved was the 
right to religious freedom that the Italian Constitution (Art. 19) guarantees 
to all religious communities, based on the key principle of equal freedom 
that orientates church-state relationships (Article 8.1 of the Constitution). 
As a difficult balance between Articles 32 (protection of health as an 
individual and collective right) and 19 of the Constitution was required, 
the government operated in its proper sphere, which is covered by specific 
constitutional safeguards (Art. 7.1 of the Constitution);32 Article 7.1 is the 
bastion of a secular state and defines the specific tasks of the State in 
relation to religious freedom33. 
From a literal interpretation perspective, Article 19 seems to 
guarantee freedom of religious worship, with the only limit being the 
respect of morality. This provision cannot, however, be read outside of the 
constitutional structure, in which all constitutional provisions contribute 
to define a unitary framework34. Instead, Article 19 has to be read in 
conjunction with Article 17 (right of association), with the result that it 
may be possible that religious gatherings can be subject to limits related to 
security and public safety35.  
It seems that the government, when imposing the current 
precautionary provisions, ignored any balancing process, as the provisions 
give absolute priority to the protection of health, to the detriment of the 
collective exercise of religious worship36. 
However, limitations on some specific ways of exercising religious 
freedom seemed inextricably connected to the “fundamental state task”-
the protection of health-that obviously sought to preserve the “supreme 
good” of life, which was at imminent high risk because of the COVID-19 
infection37. 
For this compelling reason, the balance worked in favor of health. 
The weight of the public health dimension as a collective interest was 
emphasized during phase one of the current emergency situation. As 
                                                             
31 See G. CALABRESI, P. BOBBITT, Tragic Choices, cit. 
32 See. A. FERRARI, Covid-19 e libertà religiosa, cit.; N. COLAIANNI, La libertà di culto 
al tempo del coronavirus, Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., 7/2020, pp. 1-40.  
33 See S. DOMIANELLO, Aporie e opacità dell’otto per mille, cit., pp. 1-32. 
34 See N. COLAIANNI, La libertà di culto, cit., p. 31. 
35 See N. COLAIANNI, La libertà di culto, cit., p. 31. 
36 See F. DE STEFANO, La pandemia aggredisce anche il diritto, cit.  
37 See N. COLAIANNI, La libertà di culto, cit., 32. 
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Marta Cartabia (President of the Constitutional Court) underlined during 
an interview in April 2020, the constitutional text remains the “compass” 
that governs the relationships between “public institutions and citizens”38. 
The constitutional text covers the possibility of limiting individual and 
collective rights, and constitutional case law has established that any 
balance of competing rights has to be managed in the light of the 
principles of proportionality, adequacy, reasonableness and necessity39.  
This is consistent with the protection of religious freedom in 
international treaties40 and at the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) level (Art. 9.2), which provides that freedom to manifest one’s 
religion or beliefs may be subject to limitations connected to the interests 
of public safety, health, morals and even the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others41. The last element clearly expands the possibility of 
restrictions on the exercise of religious freedom in the name of general 
third-party interests, which are not definable in advance42. 
From an ECHR perspective, a “guarantee of proportionality”43 has 
become the main standard, which enables the reconciliation of competing 
rights and the principles of adequacy, proportionality, and necessity in the 
pursuit of a legitimate aim, where the use of the least restrictive means has 
become the most appropriate “yardstick of reasonableness”44. These 
principles are aimed at not only preventing undue limitations of religious 
freedom but also overexpansion of religious freedom, which would result 
                                                             
38 See G. BIANCONI, Coronavirus, intervista a Marta Cartabia: «Nella Costituzione le vie 
per uscire dalla crisi», in Corriere della Sera, April 20, 2020 
(https://www.corriere.it/esteri/20_aprile_29/coronavirus-intervista-marta-cartabia-nella-costituzi 
one-vie-uscire-crisi-c1893622-8982-11ea-8073-abbb9eae2ee6.shtml). 
39 See G. BIANCONI, Coronavirus, intervista a Marta Cartabia, cit.; N. COLAIANNI, La 
libertà di culto, cit., p. 26. 
40 See Article 18 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
41 See N. COLAIANNI, La libertà di culto, cit., p. 32. 
42 See A. LICASTRO, paper presented at the webinar “La libertà religiosa in Italia ai 
tempi del COVID-19”, cit. 
43 See N. COLAIANNI, Voci in dialogo: organizzazioni, istituzioni di tendenza e diritti delle 
parti, Seconda voce, in Quad. Dir. Pol. Eccl., 1/2013, p. 235. 
44 See A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto e i suoi limiti nella più recente 
giurisprudenza nazionale e sovranazionale, in A. FUCCILLO (ed.), Le proiezioni civili delle 
religioni tra libertà e bilateralità. Modelli di disciplina giuridica, ESI, Napoli, 2017, pp. 560-562, 
and its bibliographical references; M. CARTABIA, I principi di ragionevolezza e 
proporzionalità nella giurisprudenza costituzionale italiana, relazione presentata alla 
Conferenza trilaterale delle Corti Costituzionali italiana, portoghese e spagnola, Roma, 
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in an undue “immunization” of religious freedom against any form of 
conflict with other “constitutionally protected interests”45.  
Following this perspective, the Italian Constitutional Court stated 
that the constitutional protection of fundamental rights is grounded on 
their “mutual integration” as no one of them can be recognized has having 
absolute dominance, thereby becoming a “tyrant” compared with other 
constitutionally protected “juridical situations”46.  
Given the serious threat to public health, its devastating impact, the 
uncertainty about the evolution of COVID-19, the risks to the capacity of 
the health-care system, proportionality was assessed not “in abstract” but 
taking into consideration the concrete circumstances of fact47. 
Furthermore, the balance took into serious consideration not only the 
dichotomy of public health and collective religious worship, but also the 
strength of Article 2 of the Constitution, which imposes on people, both 
collectively and individually, a duty of solidarity, as well as Article 4, 
which imposes the duty on everyone to participate in the material and 
spiritual advancement of society48. The exceptional and temporary nature 
of the emergency defined the “limits” of the “legitimacy” of the 
precautionary measures and justified the absolutization of the protection 
of public health and the impossibility of balancing competing rights in a 
way that could provide a reasonable accommodation for the exercise of 
religious freedom, without any intention of denying its distinctive nature 
and role in our pluralistic democratic system49.  
The “balance” reached was not an attempt to establish “a 
permanent hierarchical order” of constitutional values, but was strictly 
connected with the emergence of the pandemic50. 
Other commentators complained that the path of cooperation, 
which is a distinctive feature of the Italian model of church-state 
                                                             
45 See A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto, cit., pp. 560-562, and its 
bibliographical references. 
46 See Constitutional Court, No. 85 of 2013; A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di 
culto, cit., p. 560, and its bibliographical references. 
47 See F. DE STEFANO, La pandemia aggredisce anche il diritto, cit.  
48 See F. DE STEFANO, La pandemia aggredisce anche il diritto, cit.; P. CONSORTI, 
Esercizi di laicità: dalla bilateralità pattizia al dialogo interreligioso (a causa del Covid-19), 
Università di Pisa, 7 May 2020 (https://people.unipi.it/pierluigi_consorti/esercizi-di-laicità-
dalla-bilateralità-pattizia-al-dialogo-interreligioso--a-causa-del-covid-19/); G MACRÌ, La libertà 
religiosa alla prova del Covid-19. Asimmetrie giuridiche nello “stato di emergenza” e nuove 
opportunità pratiche di socialità”, Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., 9/2020), p. 24. 
49 See F. DE STEFANO, La pandemia aggredisce anche il diritto, cit.. 
50 See F. DE STEFANO, La pandemia aggredisce anche il diritto, cit.  
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relationships, was not properly enhanced51. Given that the circumstances 
certainly did not allow for the proper legal procedures, a robust academic 
debate evolved about how religious authorities should have been 
involved, and whether the informal ways employed for such consultation 
could be assessed as completely satisfactory52.  
Certainly, coronavirus disease preventive measures negatively 
affected religious freedom of all religious communities, which all suffered 
the same burdensome restrictions, but whether and to what degree the 
measures put all of them on an equal level remains an open question.  
The availability of social media, offering religious groups 
supplementary resources to guarantee alternative ways to exercise a 
fundamental right, mitigated the exceptional precautionary measures53, 
which the Catholic Church made extraordinary use of during the Easter 
period. The crucial concerns are whether these resources guaranteed and 
supported an effective pluralistic religious liberty, whether the alternative 
measures satisfied, to the same degree, the religious needs of all religious 
groups, and whether more visibility was given to majority groups, to the 
detriment of religious minorities54. 
 
 
4 - A “cautious resumption” of religious gatherings during the phase 
two in Italy  
 
In any event, in the first phase, religious groups quietly accepted 
restrictions and, in some cases, autonomously adopted self-imposed 
restrictions, even though some isolated incidents of disobedience 
occurred. As far as the Catholic Church is concerned, its general conduct 
displayed strong coherence with Article 1 of the Agreement between the 
State and the Catholic Church, pursuant to which it is committed to 
mutual cooperation for the good of the person and the nation. 
                                                             
51 See V. PACILLO, La sospensione del diritto di libertà religiosa in tempo di pandemia”, in 
OLIR, 16 March 2020 (https://www.olir.it/focus/vincenzo-pacillo-la-sospensione-dei-diritti-nel-
tempo-della-pandemia/). 
52 See A. LICASTRO, Il lockdown della libertà, cit., 238, L.M. GUZZO, Law and Religion 
During (and After) Covid-19 Emergency: The Law is Made for Man not Man for Law, in 
Diresom, 30 March 2020 (https://diresom.net/2020/03/30/law-and-religion-during-and-after-
covid-19-emergency-if-the-law-is-made-for-man-for-law/). 
53 See A. LICASTRO, Il lockdown della libertà, cit., 239. 
54 See A. LICASTRO, Il pluralismo in materia religiosa nel settore dei «media», in S. 
DOMIANELLO, Diritto e religione in Italia. Rapporto nazionale sulla salvaguardia della libertà 
religiosa in regime di pluralismo confessionale e culturale, 2012, il Mulino, Bologna, p. 96. 
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However, in “phase two” the crucial challenge will be to reconcile 
effective measures of prevention of the disease with the essential 
guarantees of protection for fundamental rights. So the precautionary 
measures have to be updated taking into consideration the development 
of the situation, and avoiding disproportionate restrictions55. As witnessed 
by an intensive dialogue and a preliminary discussion between the 
National Episcopal Conference and the Italian government, great 
expectations of a resumption of religious activities accompanied the first 
steps toward the beginning of this second phase. Italian Academics too 
submitted proposals for a “cautious resumption” of religious assemblies 
with measures aimed at preventing the spread of the COVID-19 
infection56. At first, concern about mass gatherings and the more 
vulnerable condition of many elderly religious adherents nevertheless 
prevailed and such expectations have not yet , as of early May, been 
fulfilled. The Presidential decree of 26 April 2020, covering the period 
from 4 to 18 May, did not grant the hoped-for resumption of religious 
ceremonies, with the exception of funerals, even though it provided for a 
progressive loosening of lockdown restrictions in relation to some 
businesses. According to the decree, religious ceremonies must be held in 
open spaces, and are limited to a maximum of 15 people) and have to 
comply with other precautionary measures. The Administrative Court 
dismissed the precautionary request of suspension of the decree of 26 
April 2020, briefly determining that in the balance of competing interests, 
the preservation of health prevails57. 
The Italian Conference of Bishops reacted harshly to the decree, and 
released a statement claiming a violation of freedom of worship, as the 
new provisions “arbitrarily excluded the possibility of celebrating Mass 
with the people”. The impact of the statement was reduced by Pope 
Francis, who, in a homily, solicited obedience to civil laws and a cautious 
                                                             
55 See A. FUCCILLO, La libertà contagiata dal virus? La libertà religiosa nella collaborazione 
Stato-Chiesa nell’emergenza covid-19, in OLIR, 21 April 2020 (https://www.olir.it/focus/antonio-
fuccillo-la-religione-contagiata-dal-virus-la-liberta-religiosa-nella-collaborazione-stato-chiesa-nelle 
mer genza-covid-19/); P. CONSORTI, La libertà religiosa, cit., p. 385. 
56 See DIRESOM, Proposal for a Safe Resumption of Religious Celebrations in Italy, in 
Diresom, 27 April 2020 (https://diresom.net/2020/04/27/position-paper-proposta-per-una-cauta-
ripresa-in-sicurezza-delle-celebrazioni-religiose/). 
57 See Administrative Court of Lazio-Rome, Section I, April 29, 2020, no. 3453. The 
court added that the sacrifice of the understandable need to physically participate in 
religious ceremonies can be considered temporarily compensated by the possibility of 
satisfying one's religious sentiment by taking advantage of the numerous alternatives 
offered through IT tools. 
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attitude because of the risk of resurgence of the infection and the 
Conference of Bishops, which later declared its intent to avoid conflicts 
with the Italian government, in view of its wish to loyally cooperate with 
the government. The Prime Minister guaranteed that “a protocol will be 
studied that will allow the faithful to participate in liturgical celebrations 
as soon as possible in conditions of maximum security”. The Episcopal 
Conference and the Italian government eventually reached a preliminary 
agreement about guidelines that should govern the second phase, which 
resulted in a protocol on May 7 2020, allowing a cautious resumption of 
religious celebrations, provided that measures concerning sanitization of 
premises, social distancing, size requirements of the venue, and other 
precautionary measures are complied with. This protocol seeks to satisfy 
the specific religious needs of the Catholic Church, even though local 
detail is missing, giving rise to the question of whether the protocol 
should be homogeneously applied in every regional context, or whether 
different local situations should be assessed as appropriate58.  
Furthermore, phase two led to a new complex legal framework of 
emergency measures, which included a conversion into law of a previous 
decree, a law decree, and a decree of the president of the cabinet59. This 
                                                             
58 The bishops of Sardinia showed disappointment at not having been consulted. They 
decided to resume religious gatherings starting from 4 May, with the due precautionary 
measures, claiming a judicial distinction between religious functions and religious 
ceremonies, which would be grounded on Article 405 of the Criminal Code. According to 
A. LICASTRO, Il lockdown della libertà, cit., p. 234, such distinction is connected to the 
essential or ancillary nature of ceremonies for worship. 
59 See L. n. 35, May 22, 2020, which converted the decree n. 19 of March 25, 2020 and at 
Article 1.2.g repeats the “limitation or suspension of events or initiatives of any nature, of 
events and of any other form of meeting or gathering in a public or private place, 
including those of a cultural, recreational, sporting, recreational and religious nature”. 
The government is still allowed to establish a “suspension of civil and religious 
ceremonies [and the] limitation of entry to places intended for worship”. However, on 6 
May 2020 an amendment to the converted law was approved, which provided that the 
government had to adopt health protocols in agreement with the Catholic Church and 
with religious denominations “different from the catholic one”. See also decree May 6 
2020, “Further urgent measures to deal with the epidemiological emergency from Covid-
19”, Article 1.11, ruling on religious gatherings: “Religious functions with the 
participation of people are carried out in compliance with the protocols signed by the 
Government and by the respective confessions containing the appropriate measures to 
prevent the risk of contagion”. Art. 1.12 specified that the provisions concerning religious 
assemblies “are implemented with measures adopted pursuant to Article 2 of decree-law 
no. 19 of 2020, which may also establish different terms of effectiveness”. Finally, 
President of the Ministry Council decree May 17, 2020, addressed both individual 
worshipping at Art.1.1n: “access to places of worship takes place with organizational 
measures to avoid gatherings of people, taking into account the size and characteristics of 
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framework intertwines with the protocols with certain religious groups 
seeking to define the necessary measures for the safe performance of 
religious functions60. The protocols aimed to solve the problems religious 
communities were facing in connection with the then-current health 
measures and to find shared solutions, taking into account the specific 
needs of every faith community. So the spirit of the protocols mirrors the 
idea of dialogue and confrontation that led the 5 May 2020 meeting of the 
Minister of Internal Affairs and representatives of many religious groups.  
The current emergency crisis therefore offers the opportunity for 
the State to promote and implement a more effective pluralistic 
framework, where social actors, including religious ones, should not be 
“marginalized”, but instead invited to give their “contribution to the 
enhancement of social dynamics”61. However, the Minister did not opt for 
the adoption of a unitary protocol for all religious groups, instead opting 




5 - U.S. legal responses to COVID-19: U.S. constitutional and legal 
framework about religious freedom 
 
In the U.S. context, the reading of the free exercise clause and its extent has 
fluctuated for many years between restrictive and expansive legislative 
and judicial trends62. Although lawmakers are increasingly gaining a key 
role in religious freedom matters, so as to give rise to the perception that 
religious freedom is decreasingly governed by the free exercise clause, 
                                                                                                                                                                       
the places, and such as to guarantee visitors the opportunity to respect the distance 
between them of at least one meter”, and collective forms of worshipping at art.1.1o: 
“religious functions with the participation of people are carried out in compliance with 
the protocols signed by the government and the respective confessions”. 
59 See. A. TIRA, Normativa emergenziale ed esercizio pubblico del culto. Dai 
protocolli con le confessioni diverse dalla cattolica alla legge 22 maggio 2020, n. 35, in 
Giustizia Insieme, 8 June 2020 (https://www.giustiziainsieme.it/it/diritto-dell-emergenza-covid-
19/1132-normativa-emergenziale-ed-esercizio-pubblico-del-culto-dai-protocolli-con-le-confessioni-
diverse-dalla-cattolica-alla-legge-22-maggio-2020-n-35?hitcoun), about the anomalies 
concerning the chronological order of this provisions, where higher sources are 
subsequent to the memorandums or were prepared during the same period.  
61 See G. MACRÌ, La libertà religiosa, cit., p. 36; P. CONSORTI, Esercizi di laicità, cit. 
62 See A. MADERA, Spunti di riflessione sulla decisione Hobby Lobby e sul suo impatto 
sulla tutela della libertà religiosa negli U.S.A., in il Diritto Ecclesiastico, vol. 125, 2014, 685 ff., 
and its bibliographical references. 
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case law has had deep impact on the degree of recognition of religious 
exceptions63.  
According to Sherbert v. Verner, a famous 1963 Supreme Court case 
which gave a wide reading of the free exercise clause, the government 
must demonstrate the presence of a compelling state interest whenever a 
religious person suffers a substantial burden because of a public action, 
which implied that government had to use the least restrictive means 
(strict scrutiny) to pursue its aims64. However, later, in 1990, in Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, the Supreme 
Court took a more narrow view and held that generally applicable laws 
that impose burdens on the exercise of religious freedom are 
constitutionally consistent and need only meet a rational basis review 
when they are religiously neutral65. According to this perspective, general 
applicability means that government conduct cannot selectively target 
religion “in pursuit of legitimate interests, [and] cannot in a selective 
manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief”66. 
Nonetheless, the Smith decision left open the possibility for individual 
states to adopt specific legislative religious exemptions in their own 
statutes: the Supreme Court recognized that lawmakers were expected to 
be “solicitous” toward religious convictions, delegating to “political 
processes” the option to enforce “permissive” religious exemptions67. 
However, Congress reversed the Smith rationale, enacting a 
“broadly-framed legislation” (the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993) (RFRA)68, the aim of which was to restore the compelling-interest 
and least restrictive means test in circumstances where religious freedom 
suffers a serious burden, and to operate “striking balances” between 
religious freedom and “competing prior governmental interests”69. 
Although the enactment of the RFRA revitalized the compelling state 
interest test and the strict scrutiny standard, the Boerne decision precludes 
                                                             
63 See A. MADERA, Spunti di riflessione, cit., p. 709, and its bibliographical references. 
64 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
65 See Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872 (1990). 
66 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
67 See Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 890 (1990). 
68 See 42 USC2000bb(a)(1)(1994). See D.O. CONKLE, Congressional Alternatives in the 
Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores: the (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom 
from Local and State Infringement, in UALR Law Journal, vol. 20, 1998, p. 643. 
69 See 42 USC2000bb(a)(1)(1994). 
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the application of the RFRA’s “demanding test”70 at the state level71. As 
the main protector of the constitutional framework, the Supreme Court 
clarified that Congress, with its broad intervention, “undermined vital 
principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal 
balance”72, as Congress can only enact “remedial or preventive legislation 
to enforce the 14th Amendment and its incorporation of Bill of Rights 
standards”, but it does not have “substantive power ]…] to redefine the 
meaning of the constitutional rights”73. According to the Court,  
 
“the substantial costs [the] RFRA exacts, both in practical terms of 
imposing a heavy litigation burden on the states and in terms of 
curtailing their traditional general regulatory power, far exceed any 
pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free 
Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith”74.  
 
However, the Court recognized that “the line between measures that 
remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a 
substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern”, and 
granted “wide latitude” to the Congress “in determining where it lies”75. 
In any event, any intervention should meet a “test of rationality”76, as 
proportionality and congruency are required “between the injury to be 
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end”77, taking into 
account the “nature” and the “extent” of the state constitutional 
infringement and the scope of the Congress response to that injury78. The 
                                                             
73 See R. FRETWELL WILLSON, B.A. SMITH, T.J. BEAN, Defiant Congregations in a 
Pandemic. Public Safety Precedes Religious Rights, in Canopy Forum (www.canopyforum.org), 
21 March 2020.  
71 See Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); A. MADERA, Spunti di riflessione, cit., p. 685, 
and its bibliographical references. 
72 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
73 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). See also D.O. CONKLE, 
Congressional Alternatives in the wake of City of Boerne v. Flores: the (limited) role of the 
Congress in protecting Religious Freedom from state and local infringement”, in UARL Law 
Journal, vol. 20, 1998, pp. 633-640; V.C. BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies to Stop 
the Spread of Covid-19, in Congressional Research Service, June 1. 2020, 1-5.  
74 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997). 
75 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997). 
76 See D.O. CONKLE, Congressional Alternatives, cit., p. 647. According to the Author, 
Congress could enact “procedural legislation or laws concerning specific areas of state 
and local regulation where there is an high risk of “purposeful” religious discrimination”. 
77 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See also V.C. BRANNON, Banning 
Religious Assemblies, cit., 1-5. 
78 See D.O. CONKLE, Congressional Alternatives, cit., p. 642.  
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Supreme Court recently, in March 2020, reaffirmed this understanding of 
the Congress’s powers, emphasizing that “that assessment usually 
(though not inevitably) focuses on the legislative record, which shows the 
evidence Congress had before it of a constitutional wrong”79. 
In 2006, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional legitimacy of 
the application of the RFRA to federal statutes80, as long as the 
invalidation of the RFRA at the state level is only partially filled by the 
enactment of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA), which regulates only specific aspects of religious freedom81 but 
gives a broad definition of the understanding of “exercise of religion”82.  
Furthermore, twenty-one states responded at the Boerne decision by 
enforcing their own version of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act83. 
Currently it seems that the protection of religious freedom is mainly 
entrusted to the federal and state lawmakers enacting, so conflicting views 
of religious freedom exist side by side. Given the highly pluralistic 
religious scenario in the United States, this legal framework generated a 
fragmentation of religious freedom, leaving unresolved the question of 
whether and to what extent religious exemptions have to be provided.  
The situation is increasingly complex in the wake of several 
Supreme Court decisions, which provided over-expansive reading of the 
protection of free exercise of religion grounded on federal and state 
statutes, and endorsed “new” forms of conscientious objection from 
“new” religious actors84. Many business organizations are now using the 
courts to claim a religious affiliation in order to be exempted from laws of 
general applicability, where those laws contradict their ethical-religious 
convictions85. The judicial trend toward religious accommodation has 
                                                             
79 See Allen v. Cooper, Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, No. 18-877, March 23, 2020 
80 See Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
81 See A. MADERA, Spunti di riflessione, cit., 685. 
82 The RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.) covers any exercise of religion “whether or 
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief”, being "construed in favor of 
a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of 
this chapter and the Constitution”. 
83 See A. MADERA, Spunti di riflessione, cit., p. 685, and its bibliographical references. 
84 See A. MADERA, Nuove forme di obiezione di coscienza fra oneri a carico della libertà 
religiosa e third-party burdens. Un’analisi comparativa della giurisprudenza della Corte 
Suprema U.S.A. e della Corte di Strasburgo, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., 
16/2017, p. 1, and its bibliographical references. 
85 See Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al., v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 
U.S. 682 (2014), where the Supreme Court found that closely held for-profit corporations 
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generated an ongoing and growing academic concern about third-party 
burdens (namely on vulnerable classes of individuals), the risk of 
weakening the role of nondiscrimination safeguards, with a serious 
negative impact on abortion and LGBT rights, and an increasing 
politicization of the new “culture wars”86. Therefore an increasingly 
suspicious attitude has developed about religious accommodation, mainly 
when that accommodation seems connected to a type of rising “corporate 
religious liberty”87.  
 
 
6 - The legal patchwork because of the pandemic  
 
The COVID-19 emergency exacerbated legal fragmentation88. In the early 
days of the emerging situation, several state and local governments have 
promulgated orders directing residents to stay at home, forbidding 
assemblies, and closing “non-essential” activities89. The prohibitions 
include the closure of religious premises and the banning of religious 
assembly. According to a survey in April 2020, the pandemic crisis 
generated a complex legal patchwork90. In some states, religious 
exemptions were not provided, and the ban gave rise to litigation in 
federal courts (e.g., California)91. In other states, the prohibitions clearly 
                                                                                                                                                                       
are exempt from a general applicable law (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act), 
when their owners exercise a religious objection to, if there is a less restrictive means of 
pursuing the compelling state interest, according to the provisions of the RFRA; 
Masterpiece Cakeshop LTD v. Colorado Equal Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017). See 
A. MADERA, Spunti di riflessione, cit., p. 684, and its bibliographical references; F.M. 
GEDICKS, One Cheer for Hobby Lobby: Improbable Alternatives, Truly Strict Scrutiny, and 
Employee Burdens, Harv. Journal of Law & Gender, vol. 39, 2015, p. 1. 
86 See F.M. GEDICKS, R.G. VAN TASSEL, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception 
Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, in Harvard Civil Rights-Civil 
Liberties Law Review vol. 49, 2014, p. 343; D. LAYCOCK, Religious Liberty and the Culture 
Wars, University of Illinois Law Review, 3/2014, p. 839. 
87 See M. SCHWARTZMAN, C. FLANDERS, Z. ROBINSON (eds.), The Rise of Corporate 
Religious Liberty, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2016. 
88 About federal general preventive measures to restrain the spread of the virus, see C. 
GRAZIANI, Libertà di culto e pandemia (COVID-19): La Corte Suprema degli Stati Uniti 
divisa, in Consulta on Line (www.giurcost.org), II/2020, pp. 358-360 
89 See V.C. BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., 1-5. 
90 See S. MERVOSH, D. LU, V. SVALES, Which States and Cities have Told to Residents 
to Stay at Home, in The New York Times, 20 April 2020 (https://www.nytimes. 
com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-stay-at-home-order.html). 
91 See S. MERVOSH, D. LU, V. SVALES, Which States and Cities, cit.; V.C. 
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also include religious assemblies, but there are exceptions when 
gatherings (including religious ones) meet strict number limitations, so as 
to guarantee social distancing92. Some states have issued official 
interpretative guidelines to clarify whether religious gatherings can take 
place and the size of gatherings93. In any event, online services have been 
strongly encouraged. Yet other states seem to allow religious exceptions 
provided that appropriate physical distancing and size restrictions are 
respected94.  
Even in those states that formally provide religious exceptions, and 
qualify religious services as “essential services” along with other secular 
activities, religious worship is subject to restrictions, the stringency of 
which varies from state to state95. Such de minimis accommodations are 
also allowed in states that do not recognize exemptions for religious 
groups96. The main difference among states seems to be that some state 
orders make explicit use of the language of religious exemption, while 
others don’t have express exemptions, even though churches are subject to 
the same limitations and permissions provided for secular activities, in 
relation to social distancing, size requirements, and sanitization measures.  
Many religious communities embraced alternative ways of 
practicing their rituals, using technological devices, and encouraging their 
adherents to follow the precautionary measures, thus giving rise to forms 
of “religious creativity” (i.e., drive-in services)97. Some states allowed a 
                                                                                                                                                                       
BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., pp. 1-5.  
92 On 11 April 2020, the Kansas Supreme Court dismissed an attempt by Republican 
leaders to reject the stay-at-home order regardless of the governor's prohibition 
concerning such gatherings. Kelly v. Legislative Coordinating Office, et al., Supreme Court of 
the State of Kansas, No. 122,765. See J. PARTON, Kansas Supreme Court Rules Legislative 
Council Can’t Overturn Governor’s Religious Service Ban, in Courthouse News Service, 11 
April 2020 (https://www.courthousenews.com/kansas-supreme-court-hears-arguments-on-fight-
over-ban-on-religious-gatherings/). See also First Baptist Church. v. Kelly, No. 20-1102-JWB, 
2020 WL 1910021 (D. Kan. Apr. 18, 2020) “[C]hurches and religious activities appear to 
have been singled out among essential functions for stricter treatment. It appears to be 
the only essential function whose core purpose - association for the purpose of worship - 
had been basically eliminated”. 
93 See V.C. BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., pp. 1-5.  
94 See S. MERVOSH, D. LU, V. SVALES, Which States and Cities, cit. 
95 See S. MERVOSH, D. LU, V. SVALES, Which States and Cities, cit.; V.C. 
BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., pp. 1-5.  
96 See S. MERVOSH, D. LU, V. SVALES, Which States and Cities, cit. 
97 See M. FAGGIOLI, Pandemic and Religious Liberty in the USA; Between Privatization of 
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specific relaxation of stay-at home order for the celebration of religious 
holidays, funerals, or to meet the needs of end- of-life individuals 
(Colorado, North Carolina) or allowed churches to “open their doors to 
people who walk in who want a quiet place to pray alone” (District of 
Columbia)98 In some cases, further exemptions are provided for religious 
organizations also engaged in providing primary goods or services 
(Kentucky, Michigan)99.  
Freedom of religion is surely in accordance with interests of the 
highest order that are guaranteed under the Constitution, but this 
protection does not imply an absolute right to engage in conduct coherent 
with one’s religious convictions. The question is whether and to what 
extent state governments can limit religious freedom when an emergency 
situation occurs100.  
Some academics claim that religion can “harm” when it negatively 
affects public health policies intended to prevent the spread of an ominous 
infection101. On the flip side, some conservative religious groups-with 
strong connections to President Trump and the Republican Party-support 
the idea that religious groups should enjoy exemptions from stay-at-home 
orders, including being allowed in-person services102.  
 
 
7 - Judicial balance between individual liberties and the preservation of 
health 
 
A crucial issue seems to be that preservation of health is a matter within 
state jurisdiction under the Tenth Amendment103. The constitutional text 
provides for states to perform many “vital functions of modern 
government”, including “police power”104, even though the federal 
jurisdiction is required to protect “individual liberties”105.  
                                                             
98 See M. FAGGIOLI, Pandemic and Religious Liberty, cit. 
99 See M. FAGGIOLI, Pandemic and Religious Liberty, cit. 
100 See V.C. BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., pp. 1-5.  
101 See M.A. HAMILTON, Toxic Religious Liberty in the Covid-19 Era, in Verdict, 7 April 
2020 (https://verdict.justia.com/2020/04/07/toxic-religious-liberty-in-the-covid-19-era); S.H. 
BARCLAY, First Amendment “Harms”, in Indiana Law Journal, vol. 95, 2020, p. 331; , 
Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., pp. 1-5. 
102 See M. FAGGIOLI, Pandemic and Religious Liberty, cit. 
103 See US. Const., amend. X”.The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people”. 
104 D. MESSERE MAGEE, The Constitution and Federalism in the Age of Pandemic, in Ri. 
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Mile stone decisions underlined that even though United States 
“law, policy and culture” is inclined to emphasize individual freedoms, 
the Constitution , in its preamble, recognizes the importance of the 
“general welfare” of the “people”106. Public health laws mirror 
constitutional standards, aim to protect the common good, namely the 
health and the welfare of the whole community, and establish 
responsibilities to safeguard public health.  
According to the Supreme Court,  
 
“in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving 
the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of his 
liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be 
subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, 
as the safety of the general public may demand”107 even where “a 
statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, 
the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial 
relation to those objects, or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable 
invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law”108.  
 
As a result, government can take extraordinary, temporary 
measures to protect the public. Extraordinary emergency situations, as the 
Fifth Circuit recently emphasized in April 2020,  
 
“allow the state to restrict, for example, one’s right to peaceably 
assemble, to publicly worship, to travel, and even to leave one’s 
home”109. Furthermore, “[t]he right to practice religion freely does not 
include the liberty to expose the community […] to communicable 
disease”110.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
Bar. Jnl., 68, May 2020, pp. 11-14. 
105 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 
(1992): "State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: rather, federalism secures to citizens 
the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power”; National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 567 U.S. 519, 183 L.Ed.2d 450, 80 U.S.L.W. 
4579, 23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 480, (2012): “By denying any one government complete 
jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the 
individual from arbitrary power”. 
106 See U.S. Const. pmbl.; B.L. ATWELL, From Public Health to Public Wealth: The Case 
for Economic Justice, in Kentucky Law Journal, vol. 108, 2019-2020, p. 388.  
107 See Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (concerning 
mandatory vaccinations). 
108 See Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905).  
109 See In re Abbott, - F.3d -, 2020 WL. 1685929, 6 (5th Cir. Apr. 7, 2020); V.C. 
BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., pp. 1-5. 
110 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
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The Jacobson111 and Prince112 cases show that when serious health 
issues are involved, public well-being is “paramount”, even though these 
issues can negatively affect individual liberties113. However, it cannot be 
underestimated that in the Jacobson case no First Amendments issues were 
involved: this lack gave rise to the claim that it can be considered just a 
sort of “precursor” and not an “alternative” to the “strict scrutiny required 
for laws infringing free exercise rights”114. 
During a pandemic, state powers are subject to a de minimis judicial 
review, with enhanced weight given to the medical experts assessing the 
most appropriate strategies to deal with the crisis115: when a health crisis 
occurs the Supreme Court should rely on a rational basis review, so state 
regulations can be judicially subverted only where the Jacobson standards 
are met116. Currently, if a health emergency is occurring, state 
governments are empowered to adopt the most appropriate measures, 
and their powers are grounded on specific statutes117. Congress in fact 
stated that, "[n]o court of the United States, or of any State, shall have 
subject matter jurisdiction to review, whether by mandamus or otherwise, 
any action by the Secretary under this [Public Health Service Act] 
subsection”118. Specifically, Stafford Act, which is the main “federal 
                                                             
111 See Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, cit. 
112 See Prince v. Massachusetts, cit. 
113 See B.L. ATWELL, From Public Health, cit., p. 387.  
114 Cfr. Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church, et al., Applicants v. J. B. Pritzker, Governor of 
Illinois, May 27, 2020, No. 19A1046. 
115 See Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905): “While this 
court should guard with firmness every right appertaining to life, liberty or property as 
secured to the individual by the Supreme Law of the Land, it is of the last importance that 
it should not invade the domain of local authority except when it is plainly necessary to 
do so in order to enforce that law”. Although this decision predated the incorporation of 
the Religious Clauses against the states, its rationale was re-affirmed in Sherbert. See V.C. 
BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., pp 1-5. 
116 See Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29-31 (1905) where the 
Court held that where there is a “palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental 
law" and that the “means prescribed by the State”, "to stamp out the disease”, [have] no 
real or substantial relation to the protection of the public health and the public safety”. 
So" [...] it is [then] the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the 
Constitution". 
117 D. MESSERE MAGEE, The Constitution, cit., p. 12, relies on the National 
Emergencies Act, the Public Health Service Act, the Defense Production Act of 1950, and 
the Stafford Act. All these Acts have been quoted by Trump in his Executive Order and in 
his National Emergency Declaration due to the Covid-19 pandemic. 
118 See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(b)(7). 
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emergency response statute” dealing with the pandemic, aims to balance 
“states prerogatives” and the “federal coordination scheme”, and 
“federalism” and “dual sovereignty”119, to  
 
“provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the 
Federal Government to state and local governments in carrying out 
their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which 
result from such disasters”120. 
 
The interplay between state and federal governments in relation to 
this devastating health emergency and the key role of the principle of 
subsidiarity will probably become the object of increasing debate in the 
near future121, given that the health crisis is far from over122.  
The crucial questions are whether and to what extent constitutional 
rights can be affected in the time of health emergency and how courts can 
navigate between citizens’ claims of infringement of their constitutional 
"due process" and "equal protection" guarantees and the preservation of 
common good. Case law indicates that judicial intervention is limited to 
cases when  
 
“the police power of a state, whether exercised by the legislature or 
by a local body acting under its authority” are “exerted in such 
circumstances or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in 
particular cases as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent 
wrong and oppression”123.  
 
                                                             
119 See D. MESSERE MAGEE, The Constitution, cit., p. 12. 
120 See Stafford Disaster Relief and Assistance and Emergency Act 2000, 42 U.S.C. ch. 
68 § 5121. 
121 In this complex framework, we should also rely on a mile stone decision, that 
clarified that presidential powers “are not fixed but fluctuate depending on the 
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress”. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952). 863 (Jackson, J., concurring): “[w]hen the President acts 
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its 
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can 
delegate … [w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial 
of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of 
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its 
distribution is uncertain …. [w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb”.  
122 See M.C. GREEN, Religious Freedom and Subsidiarity in the Coronavirus Pandemic, in 
Canopyforum, 3 May 2020 (https://canopyforum.org/2020/05/03/religious-freedom-subsidiarity-
in-the-coronavirus pandemic/?fbclid=IwAR1Wr_UoBO5YWRiqtlq3Eq_RrRW8dRXczGzF8nVr 
3Z1x5wgt9xkAu_-6iKg). 
123 See See Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905). 
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A further question is whether the more recent Hobby Lobby124 case 
undermined the Jacobson rationale by allowing religious exemptions to a 
generally applicable statute aimed at promoting public health and 
expanding free access to health care.  
 
 
8 - Litigation in lower courts about the exercise of religious freedom 
during Covid-19 
 
Some state prohibitions led to refusals to comply and fierce litigation, with 
religious petitioners ranging from conservative groups to extremist 
voices125.  
At first, some clergy were arrested for unlawful assembly and 
infringement of the emerging health protection rules. They ostentatiously 
refused to comply with the health emergency rules, claiming the essential 
nature of religious services, and that they had been burdened with the 
“cost” of their noncompliance that was for religious reasons126. However, 
their actions drove the subsequent amendment of the county stay-at-home 
order (making it consistent with Florida provisions) so as to include 
“attending religious services conducted in churches, synagogues and 
houses of worship” within “essential activities”127. 
In some states (e.g., California), where no accommodation was 
provided, churches challenged the stay-at-home orders, arguing that the 
orders infringe the First Amendment right to freedom of religion and 
assembly, and that the churches can practice social distancing just like 
other services that are deemed essential (California). However, district 
courts found that “during the state of emergency the executive powers 
[…] are empowered to provide for emergency remedies which may 
infringe on fundamental constitutional rights”128.  
                                                             
124 See Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al., v. Hobby Lobby Stores, cit. 
125 See Hotze v. Hidalgo, No. 2020-22609 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris Cty. Apr. 13, 2020). 
126 See P. MAZZEI, Florida Pastor arrested after Defying Virus Orders, in New York Times, 
March 30, 2020 (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/us/coronavirus-pastor-arrested-tampa-
florida.html); see V.C. BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., 1-5. 
127 See State of Florida, Office of the Governor, Executive Order Number 20-91, Section 
3Ai. 
128 See Z. BUDRYK, Judge Rejects Attempt by Three California Churches To Hold Services 
Despite Stay at Home Orders, in The Hill, 22 April 2020 (https://thehill.com/regulation/court-
battles/494243-judge-rejects-attempt-by-three-california-churches-to-hold-services); See V.C. 
BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., 1-5. 
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In other states, although limited forms of accommodation were 
provided, the main complaint of some pastors and churches is that there 
was an undue equalization of religious and secular activities, that was 
inconsistent with the First Amendment129. 
According to the petitioners, the restrictions on in-person worship 
services violated the “religious liberty” of pastors who wished to gather 
their parishioners together during the pandemic period130. In South 
Virginia, a judge rejected a suit by a resident claiming a religious 
exemption from the stay-at-home order, as it “would seriously undermine 
the Commonwealth’s efforts to slow the spread of a once-in-a-century 
pandemic”131. 
In phase one, courts seemed reluctant to uphold these challenges 
even though justices embrace different approaches to free exercise claims 
against stay-at-home orders, alternatively applying more rigorous or more 
lenient standards of review. The emergency did not destabilize the actual 
legal framework for the protection of religious freedom but emphasized 
the underlying crucial issue about which legal standard should govern 
judicial review when free exercise of religion is at stake so as to reach a fair 
balance between general rules and religious claims132.  
If precautionary measures have to be subject to a strict scrutiny, the 
judicial analysis should focus on whether the global pandemic emergency 
can be seen as a compelling state interest and whether the government has 
a less restrictive alternative by which to pursue its goals. However, given 
the pandemic situation, the protection of health could surely be deemed a 
compelling state interest. Government has a compelling interest in 
protecting the health and safety of the public, and that interest becomes 
much stronger when it is connected with the prevention of the spread of 
an infectious disease that puts lives at risk. Strict limitation of gatherings, 
even religious ones, and self-quarantine by those who are at higher risk of 
infection, in order to avoid to undermining the public interest, can be 
considered as a rational pursuit of this public interest133. Pre-Smith 
                                                             
129 See D.R. HOOVER (ed.), Religion and American Exceptionalism, Routledge, New York, 
2014. 
130 Hotze v. Hidalgo, cit. 
131 M. BARAKAT, Judge Rejects Lawsuit Over Order; No Religious Exemption, Associated 
Press, 9 April 2020 (https://wtop.com/virginia/2020/04/judge-rejects-lawsuit-over-order-no-
religious-exemption/); V.C. BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., pp. 1-5. 
132 See V.C. BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., pp. 1-5. 
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Supreme Court decisions denied religious exemptions from laws that 
protected public health from serious threats134, and lower federal courts 
complied with the rationale135. Furthermore, orders should meet the strict 
scrutiny standard and the compelling-interest test also requires that the 
challenged law be narrowly tailored to address the governmental interest 
at stake. Based on this perspective, whether orders have temporal limits 
and provide alternative ways to allow individuals to exercise their 
religious freedom should be currently seriously taken into consideration 
by courts, as well as the fact that no vaccine for COVID-19 yet exists, 
hospitals are experiencing severe shortages of the necessary personal 
protective equipment and that the viability of the health-care system is at 
risk136.  
If the Smith rationale prevails (rational basis review), claims for 
religious accommodation are not connected to a strict scrutiny test under 
the First Amendment and the religious nature of claims does not justify 
noncompliance or exceptions to generally applicable laws, which are 
neutral toward religion. From this standpoint, state orders prohibiting 
gatherings are generally applicable, religiously neutral laws, so religious 
assemblies should be subject to the provisions limiting gatherings. 
According to Smith, legal orders are consistent with the Constitution as 
long as issues of religious accommodation are placed on the same level as 
other secular interests137. Furthermore, laws forbidding fraud and 
restricting other activities that put at risk public health and safety cannot 
be subject to religious exemptions138. 
However, even when a law is pursuing legitimate interests, it 
cannot directly target religion by imposing burdens only on religiously 
motivated conduct139. So governments cannot impose restrictions on 
religious conduct while supporting “nonreligious conduct that endangers 
                                                             
134 See Sherbert v. Verner, cit. 
135 See Workman v. Mingo City Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348, 353-54 (4th Cir. 2011); 
McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (4th Cir. 1997); Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 
3d 1079, 1089-90 (S.D. Cal. 2016); Nikolao v. Lyon, 875 F.3d 310, 316 (6th Cir. 2017). 
136 See V.C. BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., 1-5. 
137 See V.C. BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., 1-5. 
138 On 10 March 2020, the State of Missouri sought a restraining order against a 
televangelist preacher so as to prohibit him from selling or advertising miracle remedies 
for COVID-19. Missouri v. Bakker, In the Circuit Court of Stone County, Mississippi. See 
S.C. PILL, Selling Religious Cures and Other First Amendment Pitfalls in the Age of 
Coronavirus, in Canopyforum, 16 March 2020 (https://canopyforum. org/2020/03/16/selling-
religious-cures-and-other-first-amendment-pitfalls-in-the-age-of-coronavirus-by-shlomo-pill/). 
139 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543 (1993). 
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[the asserted governmental] interests in a similar or greater degree”140, as 
this will result in religious discrimination141. Yet, it cannot be 
underestimated that some religious groups are more severely burdened 
by restrictive measures, as restrictions have a deeper impact on their 
practices and rites or they cannot take advantage of alternative means to 
satisfy their worshipping needs, as those means contradict some groups’ 
beliefs and values142.  
Therefore, some cases require careful analysis, to assess whether 
there was an intention to target the any specific religious group’s exercise 
of their religion or whether secular businesses received a preferential 
treatment. The potential impact of restrictions on religious groups requires 
a more rigorous level of governmental scrutiny, and government bears the 
onus of proof that pervasive precautionary measures specifically aim to 
address the emergency and the compelling state interest. We have to 
remember that recent case law has emphasized a renewed sensibility 
toward disparity of treatment or selective discriminations against 
religiously affiliated entities143.  
 
 
9 - New creative ways of worshipping in Covid-19 times: drive-in 
religious services 
 
Some successful lawsuits concerned a new creative and controversial 
worshipping practice: drive-in religious services, which allow religious 
adherents to gather in person while respecting social distancing144.  
In Kentucky a religious organization successfully challenged the 
ban against drive-in religious assemblies: on 11 April 2020, a federal 
district court issued a temporary restraining order, preventing local 
authorities from forbidding “drive-in church services” (specifically, Easter 
services)145. The federal trial court found that the banning of “drive-in 
church services” established a public policy that was not “‘neutral’ 
                                                             
140 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533-534, 542-543. 
141 See V.C. BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., 1-5. 
142 See M. FAGGIOLI, Pandemic and Religious Liberty, cit. 
143 See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc., v. Comer, 582 U.S. _ (2017). 
144 See E. SCHOR, Religious Freedom Attorneys Pick their Battles Amid Pandemic, in AP 
News, 7 April 2020 (https://apnews.com/d32b6b477e0500db86a5ccf2c10a13bd). 
145 See Fire Christian Center v. Greg Fischer, No. 3:20-cv-264-JRW, 2020 WL 1820249 
(W.D. Ky. Apr. 11, 2020); V.C. BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., 1-5. 
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between religious and non-religious conduct”146. In fact, the local 
authority (the mayor of Louisville) issued “orders and threats that [were] 
not ‘generally applicable’ to both religious and non-religious conduct”, as 
the orders allowed other secular activities (non-religious drive-ins and 
drive-throughs, including drive-through liquor stores) to remain open147. 
According to the court,  
 
“the principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, 
cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct 
motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of the rights 
guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause”148.  
 
The trial court referred to the Fifth’s Circuit’s test for assessing the 
emergency order, and emphasized the need for appropriate deference to 
“the expertise of public health officials in evaluating potential distinctions 
between a drive-in church and other permitted essential activities”149.  
However, emergency measures should be implemented when they 
“have at least some ‘real or substantial relation’ with the actual emergency 
situation and are not ‘beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of 
rights secured by the fundamental law’”150. In the Fire Christian Center 
case, the municipal health measures were held as “underinclusive” 
because other equally dangerous (or equally harmless) activities were 
permitted by virtue of being deemed “essential”151.  
The federal district court held that, according to the Kentucky 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the municipality conduct had 
to be subject to a “strict scrutiny” analysis, proving that the public interest 
is compelling and regulation narrowly addressed to pursue that interest. 
Although the regulation met the first standard, banning residents from 
“worshiping together” “in the relative safety of their cars” seems not to be 
“the least restrictive means to prevent the spread of coronavirus”152. The 
court found that the order, “beyond all question”, violated the free 
exercise clause as the order was not “narrowly tailored to advance that 
interest”153. The government’s “proffered objectives are not pursued with 
                                                             
146 See Fire Christian Center v. Greg Fischer, cit. 
147 See Fire Christian Center v. Greg Fischer, cit. 
148 See Fire Christian Center v. Greg Fischer, cit. 
149 See In re Abbott, - F.3d -, 2020 WL. 1685929 (5th Cir. Apr. 7, 2020); V.C. BRANNON, 
Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., pp. 1-5. 
150 See Fire Christian Center v. Greg Fischer, cit. 
151 See Fire Christian Center v. Greg Fischer, cit.  
152 See Fire Christian Center v. Greg Fischer, cit. 
153 See Fire Christian Center v. Greg Fischer, cit. 
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respect to analogous nonreligious conduct, and those interests could be 
achieved by narrower ordinances that burdened religion to a far lesser 
degree”154. Louisville’s actions seem disproportionate because the public 
interest in preventing religious adherents from spreading COVID-19 
would be achieved by welcoming the accommodation proposed by the 
religious organization, namely drive-in religious services. So the strict 
scrutiny test was not satisfied, as religious drive-in services received a 
harsher treatment than non-religious gatherings155. 
However, in relation to a San Diego order forbidding religious 
assemblies, the California federal court refused to afford a church a similar 
exemption for drive-in services, even though the municipality allowed 
gatherings for several other businesses. The federal judge held that the 
order, as a law of general applicability, could survive the Smith standards. 
The California government had an overriding interest in protecting public 
health from an imminent threat and the church could provide streaming 
services156. It now appears that San Diego county is modified its previous 
precautionary measures and allows drive-in church services, provided 
that social distancing is guaranteed157.  
 
 
10 - Third-party burdens and the successful nondiscrimination approach 
 
Case law shows that the possibility that religious accommodation can 
detrimentally affect third parties has to receive equal serious 
consideration. The neutrality rule, grounded on the establishment clause, 
prohibits government not only from targeting religious groups for 
discriminatory treatment, but also from granting religious exemptions that 
would have a serious negative impact on nonbeneficiaries: the latter 
situation would result in a preferential treatment of religion over the 
rights and interests of nonbeneficiaries, thereby infringing the 
establishment clause158. The free exercise case law complied with this 
rationale, showing that religious exceptions that significantly impact on 
                                                             
154 See Fire Christian Center v. Greg Fischer, cit.; V.C. BRANNON, Banning Religious 
Assemblies, cit., 1-5. 
155 See Fire Christian Center v. Greg Fischer, cit.  
156 See V.C. BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., 1-5. 
157 See G. MORAN, San Diego County says it will allow drive-in church services, in The 
San Diego Union Tribune, 22 April 2020 (https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/ 
news/courts/story/2020-04-22/san-diego-county-says-it-will-allow-drive-in-church-services). 
158 See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
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others are not constitutionally viable. The Supreme Court established that 
a religious accommodation “must be measured so that it does not override 
other significant interests”159 and must not “impose substantial burdens 
on nonbeneficiaries”160, with the only exceptions being matters that fall 
into the exclusive purview of religious organizations161.  
The issue of third-party burdens arose in another case162, where 
some Kentucky residents claimed an exemption from Kentucky’s Cabinet 
for Health and Family Services order, which temporarily prohibited mass 
gatherings.  
In the Kentucky case, a national nonsectarian organization 
(Americans United for Separation of Church and State) filed an amicus 
brief, arguing that it would be unconstitutional to exempt religious 
gatherings from the order and to exempt from quarantine those who have 
attended religious gatherings. The amicus brief argues that the order 
complies with the standards defined by the Supreme Court in Smith, 
which held that “general applicable laws reflecting no discriminatory 
intent toward religion do not violate the Free Exercise Clause”163. In the 
present case, the challenged measures applied to all mass gatherings, 
including religious ones, with the only exception being essential activities; 
and there is no government intention to discriminate against religion by 
targeting only religious activities for failing to follow the precautionary 
measures. In addition, according to the brief, the order would be 
consistent even with the heightened review under the compelling state 
interest test, “because the challenged public-health measures are narrowly 
tailored to advance the compelling governmental interest in protecting 
Kentucky residents from a deadly disease”164. Finally, the amicus curiae 
emphasized that the establishment clause forbids the government from 
imposing harms on third parties when it recognizes a religious exemption, 
as it would “impermissibly favor the benefited religion and its adherents 
                                                             
159 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005) 
160 See Texas Monthly, In. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18, n.8 (plurality opinion). 
161 See Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Evangelical Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 194-
95 (2012), S.H. BARCLAY, First Amendment “Harms”, cit., pp. 343-345. 
162 See Roberts, et al., v. Neace, et al., No. 2:20-cv-054, ECF. No. 46 (E.D. Ky. May 4, 2020), 
appeal docketed, No. 20-5465 (6th Cir. May 5, 2020). 
163 See Roberts, et al., v. Neace, et al., cit., Brief of Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. 
164 See Roberts, et al., v. Neace, et al., Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State, cit. 
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over the rights, interests, and beliefs of the nonbeneficiaries”165. It is 
remarkable that the amicus curiae relies on other courts’ decisions that 
rejected similar challenges, not only concerning claims for religious 
exemptions, but also exceptions for firearms businesses166.  
However, it seems, once again, that where claims focus on the non-
discrimination standards, which imply courts triggering strict scrutiny 
review, this approach is successful where states permit comparable 
gatherings, and prevails over third-party burden concerns.  
In the Kentucky case, in fact, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
eventually prohibited the enforcement of the executive order, finding that 
restrictions on drive-in and in-person worship services violated the First 
Amendment when “serial exemptions for secular activities pose 
comparable public health risks”167. The court recognized that “on one side 
of the line, a generally applicable law that incidentally burdens religious 
practice usually will be upheld”168. However, the court found that the 
Kentucky order  
 
“likely fall[s] on the prohibited side of the line”, as “a law that 
discriminates against religious practices usually will be invalidated 
because it is the rare law that can be justified by a compelling interest 
and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest”169. Furthermore 
“the Governor has offered no good reason for refusing to trust the 
congregants who promise to use care in worship in just the same way 
it trusts accountants, lawyers, and laundromat workers to do the 
                                                             
165 See Roberts, et al., v. Neace, et al., Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State, cit. 
166 See Maryville Baptist Church v. Beshear, No. 3:20-cv-278-DJH-RSE, 2020 WL 2393359 
(W.D. Ky. May 8, 2020): although it previously denied the temporary restraining order, 
the court later granted preliminary injunction. The court eventually held that the 
governor failed to meet the burden to prove the less restrictive means under the strict 
scrutiny standard: “The Governor fails, however, to present any evidence or even 
argument that there was no other, less restrictive, way to achieve the same goals”. The 
court also held plaintiffs were likely to succeed on merits of free exercise and Kentucky 
RFRA claims for both drive-in and in-person services. See also Legacy Church v. Kunkel, 
No. 1:20-cv-327, ECF No. 29 (D.N.M. Apr. 17, 2020) Tolle v. Northam, No. 1:20-cv-00363-
LMB-MSN, ECF No. 9 (E.D. Va. Apr. 8, 2020) Nigen v. New York, No. 1:20-cv-1576- EK-PK, 
ECF No. 7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2020); Binford v. Sununu, No. 217-2020-CV-152 (N.H. Super. 
Ct. Mar. 25, 2020); Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, No. 68 MM 2020, _ A.3d _, 2020 WL 
1847100, at *1 (Pa. Apr. 13, 2020); Civil Rights Defense Firm v. Wolf, No. 63 MM 2020, __ 
A.3d__, 2020 WL 1329008, at *1 (Pa. Mar. 22, 2020); Brandy v. Villanueva, No. 2:20-cv-2874, 
ECF No. 29 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2020).  
167 See Roberts, et al., v. Neace, et al., cit. 
168 See Roberts, et al., v. Neace, et al., cit. 
169 See Roberts, et al., v. Neace, et al., cit. 
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same. The limitations cannot even be justified by the fact that 
religious congregations can gather online as the free exercise clause 
does not protect sympathetic religious practices alone” and “the 
federal courts are not to judge how individuals comply with their 
own faith as they see it”170. 
 
Similarly, the Eastern District of North Carolina issued a temporary 
restraining order prohibiting the North Carolina governor from enforcing 
a 10-person limit on religious worship (even though religious worship was 
categorized within essential businesses and operations) because it violated 
the free exercise clause. This case is not about drive-in services, but about 
strict size requirements; in any event, the issue of discrimination was 
raised again. The church claimed that the 10-person limit for worship 
gatherings “represent[s] precisely the sort of ‘subtle departures from 
neutrality’ that the free exercise clause is designed to prevent”171.  
The court declared that “there is no pandemic exception to the 
Constitution of the United States or the free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment”, and further argued that “these glaring inconsistencies 
between the treatment of religious entities and individuals and non-
religious entities and individuals take [the orders] outside the ‘safe harbor 
for generally applicable laws’”172. Furthermore, the North Carolina orders’ 
“impossibility” exception to the 10-person limit raises further 
constitutional concerns about strictly religious matters173.  
                                                             
170 See Roberts, et al., v. Neace, et al., cit. 
171 See Berean Baptist Church, Return America, Inc., et al., v. Governor Roy A. Cooper, III, 
No. 4:20-CV-81-D, United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. 
172 See Berean Baptist Church, Return America, Inc., et al., v. Governor Roy A. Cooper, III, 
cit. 
173 See Berean Baptist Church, Return America, Inc., et al., v. Governor Roy A. Cooper, III, 
cit.: “the Guidance then states that the 10-person indoor attendance limit does not apply 
if it is ‘not possible’ to meet outdoors…The Guidance then gives an example of 
impossibility to include when ‘particular religious beliefs dictate that some or all of a 
religious service must be held indoors and that more than ten persons must be in 
attendance’”. The Berean Baptist Church case raised the crucial question of “who decides 
whether a religious organization or group of worshipers correctly determined that their 
religious beliefs dictated the need to have more than 10 people inside to worship”? The 
Court underlined that “Under [the orders], the answer is a sheriff or another local law 
enforcement official. This court has grave concerns about how that answer comports with 
the Free Exercise Clause”. See also Tabernacle Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, No. 3:20-cv-
00033- GFVT, 2020 WL 2305307, (E.D. Ky. May 8, 2020) (statewide temporary restraining 
order), where the court emphasized that “there is ample scientific evidence that COVID-
19 is exceptionally contagious. But evidence that the risk of contagion is heightened in a 
religious setting any more than a secular one is lacking. If social distancing is good 
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However, it cannot be underestimated that the health crisis has 
given rise to many disparate religious and controversial claims, which risk 
weakening religious freedom advocacy. 
In May 2020, the owner of a faith-based business filed a lawsuit 
against a state stay-at-home-order, claiming an infringement of her 
constitutional right to exercise her religious freedom and freedom of 
speech. According to the claimant, she “has sincerely held religious beliefs 
in the Scriptures, and lives her life in an attempt to incorporate her faith 
into her everyday life”, so the closure of her activity because of the 
restraining orders, that  
 
“impermissibly burden [her] sincerely held religious beliefs, compel 
[her] to either change her beliefs or to act against them, and force 
[her] to choose between the teachings and requirements of her 
sincerely held religious beliefs and the obedience of the Orders”174.  
 
The orders were claimed by the plaintiff to be “under-inclusive [because 
they limited] their gathering prohibitions to only certain businesses or 
organizations deemed ‘essential’ or who Defendant Governor Evers or 
Defendant Secretary Palm has decided is ‘deserving’”175. This case is one 
in the growing number of faith-based business corporations that claim 
that government cannot force them to be involved in activities that 
contradict their religious beliefs.  
In addition, in April 2020, a candidate for government filed an 
individual motion against the Washington stay-at-home order, which 
included religious gatherings. The plaintiff claimed that the Washington 
Temporary Restraining Order prevented him from holding meetings with 
only one person to pray and read the Scripture, even though all the 
precautionary measures were taken, whereas similar social interaction was 
permitted to continue in some business premises176. 
 
 
11 - Department of Justice statements 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
enough for Home Depot and Kroger, it is good enough for in-person religious services, 
which, unlike the foregoing, benefit from constitutional protection”. 
174 See Kindom Knuts, and Jessica Netzel v. Anthony S. Evers, et . al., Case No. 1:20-cv-
0723, United States District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin, Northern Division. 
175 See Kindom Knuts, and Jessica Netzel v. Anthony S. Evers, et al., cit. 
176 See Joshua Freed v. Jay Inslee, The United States District Court, Western District of 
Washington, No.: 2:20-cv-00599-TLF. 
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Legal disputes over orders that impact upon religious meetings are 
unlikely to disappear in the short term, as some conservative groups are 
soliciting the re-opening of churches, while respecting sanitization, size 
requirements and distancing measures, in accordance with the Trump 
Administration’s schedule for phase two.  
Given the difficulty of reconciling conflicting rights, different sides 
have sought a congressional intervention on the issue of federal 
precautionary measures. Some lawmakers suggested a strict federal stay-
at-home order, whereas some ideological groups want a congressional 
measure that guarantees a uniform protection of religious practice across 
the nation during the pandemic emergency177 so that religious assemblies 
don’t suffer any “unequal treatment” or any “special disability” because of 
their “religious status”, compared with secular businesses178. Certain 
ideological groups ask for the congressional powers in Section 5 of the 14th 
Amendment to be used179. However, a trajectory of this kind (Congress 
using the powers in section 5) risks opening another constitutional 
conundrum, as the Supreme Court has clarified the “limited alternatives” 
that Congress enjoys “in protecting religious freedom against local and 
state infringement”180. The crucial question is whether a federal 
intervention in this controversial matter (religious freedom during the 
time of COVID-19) can be included within the “narrowly tailored 
legislation under section 5” granted to Congress on the basis of the 
Fourteenth Amendment181.  
The unparalleled health crisis has also led to several United States 
Department of Justice (DoJ) interventions in many religious liberty cases. 
These interventions solicit the relaxations of COVID-19 measures, 
claiming that a discriminatory treatment is imposed on religious activities, 
compared to that of secular businesses182. 
At first, the DoJ upheld the churches’ position, that being that they 
need protection against unequal treatment, when it addressed a statement 
                                                             
177 See V.C. BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., pp. 1-5. 
178 See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc., v. Comer, cit. 
179 See V.C. BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., pp. 1-5. 
180 See D.O. CONKLE, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores: 
the (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom from Local and State 
Infringement, in UALR Law Journal, vol. 20, 1998, pp. 633-688. 
181 See D.O. CONKLE, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores, 
cit., pp. 633-688..  
182 See A. C. MCCARTHY, It wasn't just religious liberty that Chief Justice Roberts 
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of interest in support of the plaintiff (a conservative group) in a federal 
trial court in Mississippi183. Relying on the Jacobson decision, the DoJ took 
the view that the Constitution does not prevent government from taking 
necessary, temporary measures to meet a genuine emergency184. The DoJ 
also noted that “there is no pandemic exception […] to the fundamental 
liberties the Constitution safeguards” and held that a local measure (in 
contradiction to the state order that qualified religious activities as 
“essential”) banning drive-in church services implied a discriminatory 
treatment of religious organizations as the city “fail[ed] to prohibit 
nonreligious conduct that endangers [its] interests in a similar or greater 
degree”185. As the various abovementioned provisions in relation to drive-
in worship services seem to be neither neutral nor generally applicable, 
but seem to single out religious activities for distinctive treatment, a 
heightened standard of analysis under the free exercise clause should be 
required in judicial review. However, the Mississippi RFRA seems to 
excessively burden churches’ exercise of their religion. The question is 
why banning drive-in church services has to be considered the least 
restrictive means of protecting public health, as the city allowed other 
secular activities that pose an equal risk186. According to the U.S. DoJ  
 
                                                             
183 As a result the mayor of Greenville stated that drive-in services can be attended, 
provided that precautionary measures are complied with (social distancing and windows 
closed). See E. WAGSTER PETTUS, Mayor: Drive in Church, with windows up, ok during 
the pandemic, in AP News, in 15 April 2020 (https://apnews.com/6f0b7d442d40e024f 
257d079986b51ee). Another mayor in Tennessee reversed his previous stay-at-home order 
too so as to allow drive-in services, after a filesuit had been filed against the ban. See 
Tennessee city allows drive-in church services after a lawsuit, in Ap news 18 April 2020 
(https://apnews.com/ c4471567e09afbc26bd7b62341dd7497). 
184 See Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905). 
185 The United States' Statement of Interest In Support of Plaintiffs, Temple Baptist Church v. 
City of Greenville, United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, 
Case No. 4:20-cv-64-DMB-JMV. "The court should apply heightened scrutiny under the 
free exercise clause if it determines, after applying appropriate deference to local officials, 
that the church has been treated by the city [or state] in a non-neutral and generally non-
applicable manner… if the court determines that the city's [or state's] prohibition is not in 
fact the result of a neutral and generally applicable law or rule, then the court may 
sustain it only if the city [or state] establishes that its action is the least restrictive means 
of achieving a compelling governmental interest”. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals granted an Injunction Pending Appeal to a Mississippi church enjoining 
enforcement of the Mississippi governor’s order restricting worship in First Pentecostal 
Church v. City of Holly Springs, Miss., No. 20-60399, 2020 WL 2616687 (5th Cir. 22 May 
2020). 
186 See V.C. BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., pp. 1-5.  
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“the Court should apply heightened scrutiny under the free exercise 
clause if it determines, after applying appropriate deference to local 
officials, that the church has been treated by the city [or state] in a 
non-neutral and generally non-applicable manner […] if the Court 
determines that the city's [or state's] prohibition is not in fact the 
result of a neutral and generally applicable law or rule, then the 
Court may sustain it only if the city [or state] establishes that its 
action is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling 
governmental interest"187. 
 
In May 2020, the DoJ filed a similar statement in support of a small 
congregation in Virginia, which had filed a Motion for an Injunction 
Pending Appeal, claiming its right to hold religious gatherings, provided 
that precautionary measures are taken, as the Virginia Order exempts 
various secular activities resulting in gatherings of more than 10 people188. 
The Virginia Department of Justice also relied on the abovementioned 
Lutheran Church of Columbia ruling, which underlined that the free exercise 
clause prevents the government from targeting religious organizations for 
special restrictions because of their religious identity189. 
The U.S. DoJ’s various interventions show that limitations on 
religious freedom can involve federal agencies.  
These interventions underlined one of the main differences between 
claims concerning the exclusion of religious organizations from the range 
of “essential activities” and claims concerning religious organizations that 
were subject to an unequal treatment in comparison with secular activities 
within the same geographical context190. Where state laws provide an 
equal treatment to secular and nonsecular institutions, the Supreme Court 
has upheld that public health laws can impose restrictions on the exercise 
of religious freedom in the light of a general interest191. However, religious 
organizations cannot be subject to selective discriminatory treatment192.  
The U.S. DoJ welcomed the approach that an unprecedented 
pandemic can justify a rational basis test when reviewing state actions and 
                                                             
187 See The United States' Statement of Interest In Support of Plaintiffs, Temple Baptist 
Church v. City of Greenville, United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Mississippi, cit. 
188 See The United States’ Statement of Interest in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion For an 
Injunction Pending Appeal, Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Ralph Northam, United States 
District Court Eastern District of Virginia, Case No. 2:20-cv-00204-AWA-RJK. 
189 See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017). 
190 See D. MESSERE MAGEE, The Constitution, cit., pp. 11-14. 
191 See Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905). 
192 See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, cit. 
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a high level of deference to experts’ opinion, and only extremely 
“arbitrary” “oppressive” exercise of executive powers can justify the 
“interference of the courts”193. “[Only then is it] the duty of the courts to so 
adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution”194.  
The crucial question is whether federal intervention can facilitate 
the reconciliation of competing interests or whether it risks increasing the 
current tension over the precautionary measures. The presidential use of 
religion as a “cultural wedge” enflaming an “atmosphere already 
saturated with polarizing rhetoric” cannot be underestimated195. In May 
2020, Trump identified churches as “essential services”and solicited their 
reopening, threatening to “override governors” who did not do so196.  
 
12 - Supreme Court intervention in temporary state restrictions on 
religious assemblies 
 
It is within this controversial framework that the U.S. Supreme Court 
faced the critical question of whether, and to what degree, executive 
powers are allowed to restrict fundamental liberties that are grounded in 
Constitution because of the need to preserve the public welfare during an 
extremely severe pandemic. 
On 29 May 2020, in a five to four decision, the Supreme Court 
rejected a challenge by a California church (South Bay United Pentecostal 
Church), seeking to block a ruling of the court of appeals197 about the 
enforcement of further COVID-19 restrictions relating to religious 
gatherings198. On 22 May, President Trump announced that all states must 
immediately lift their restrictions on places of worship. Then, on 25 May 
2020, Governor Newsom, the California Governor, issued new safety 
guidelines specifically relating to “Places of Worship and Providers of 
                                                             
193 See Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905). 
194 See Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905). 
195 See. L GREENHOUSE, The Supreme Court, Too, in on the Brink, in The New York 
Times, 4 June 2020 (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/opinion/sunday/supreme-court-
religion-coronavirus.html). 
196 See Press Briefing by Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany, 23 May 23, 2020 
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/press-briefing-press-secretary-kayleigh-mcena 
ny-052220/). 
197 See South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al., v. Gavin Newson, Governor of California, 
et al., No. 20-55533, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 22 May 2020. 
 
198 See South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al., v. Gavin Newson, Governor of California, 
et al., 590 U.S._ (2020). 
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Religious Services and Cultural Ceremonies”. The new guidelines 
specified how and when places of worship could reopen in California. The 
measures limited attendance at houses of worship to 25 percent of 
building capacity or a maximum of 100 people199. The plaintiffs sought 
injunctive relief against the order so as to be permitted to hold worship 
services during Pentecost Sunday (31 May 2020), by virtue of their 
commitment to adhere to the neutral social distancing requirements that 
apply in the County of San Diego which allow certain commercial 
establishments, like grocery stores, to operate under more flexible 
guidelines that do not impose percentage caps. The church claimed that 
churches and secular businesses are treated differently, which is an 
infringement of the First Amendment.  
Although the judges were split over whether public health 
measures can justify exemptions in the name of religious freedom, the 
Jacobson rationale remained the cornerstone of the decision, governing the 
balance between the safeguarding of public health and the protection of 
fundamental liberties. According to the Chief Justice’s opinion, the 
restrictions are consistent with the free exercise clause as similar 
restrictions apply to “comparable” secular activities “where large groups 
of people gather in close proximity for extended periods of time”200. 
Exemptions or more lenient treatment concern “dissimilar” activities “in 
which people neither congregate in large groups nor remain in close 
proximity for extended periods”201. Joining the liberal wing of the Court, 
Roberts (the Chief Justice) declared that “[t]he safety and the health of the 
people” has to be given precedence. According to Roberts “the precise 
question of when restrictions on particular social activities should be lifted 
during the pandemic is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter subject to 
reasonable disagreement”202. The solution of such question is therefore 
entrusted to “the politically accountable officials of the states”203. When 
those officials “undertake […] to act in areas fraught with medical and 
                                                             
199 See CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, Covid-19 Industry 
Guidance: Places of Worship and Providers of Religious Services and Cultural Ceremonies, 23 
May 2020. 
200 See South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al., v. Gavin Newson, Governor of California, 
et al., 590 U.S._ (2020). 
201 See South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al., v. Gavin Newson, Governor of California, 
et al., 590 U.S._ (2020). 
202 See South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al., v. Gavin Newson, Governor of California, 
et al., 590 U.S._ (2020). 
203 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 38 (1905). 
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scientific uncertainties”204, their freedom of action “must be especially 
broad”205. Furthermore,  
 
“where those broad limits are not exceeded, they should not be 
subject to second-guessing by an ‘unelected federal judiciary,’ which 
lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess public 
health and is not accountable to the people”206.  
 
So for this reason, the claim that the state measures are unconstitutional 
seems “improbable”207. The decision confirms the judgement of the court 
of appeals, which found that in the present case churches had not been 
singled out for discriminatory treatment and a correct balance between 
competing interests has been reached. Making reference to another mile 
stone Supreme Court test case208, the court of appeals declared that:  
 
“We’re dealing here with a highly contagious and often fatal disease 
for which there presently is no known cure […] if a court does not 
temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will 
convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact”209. 
                                                             
204 Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). 
205 Marshall v. United States, cit. 
206 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 545 (1985). 
207 See South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al., v. Gavin Newson, Governor of California, 
et al., 590 U.S._ (2020). 
208 See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (dissenting opinion of Robert 
Jackson). 
209 However, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Daniel P. Collins wrote that California 
had failed to comply “with its constitutional duty to accommodate a critical element of 
the free exercise of religion - public worship […]. I do not doubt the importance of the 
public health objectives that the state puts forth […] but the state can accomplish those 
objectives without resorting to its current inflexible and overbroad ban on religious 
services”. He underlined that the South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al. decision “has 
established a very strong likelihood of success on the merits of this claim”. California 
relied on “no authority that can justify its extraordinary claim that the current emergency 
gives the Governor the power to restrict any and all constitutional rights”. California did 
not simply “proscribe specific forms of underlying physical conduct that it identified as 
dangerous, such as failing to maintain social distancing or having an excessive number of 
persons within an enclosed space”. Instead, it “presumptively prohibited California 
residents from leaving their homes for any reason”, other than when an exception 
“granted back the freedom to conduct particular activities or to travel back and forth to 
such activities”. San Diego County allowed the reopening of many secular activities; 
nevertheless, “religious services” are included in a wider class along with “movie 
theaters” and other “personal & hospitality services”. According to Judge Collins the 
postponement of the reopening of in-person “religious services” to a future stage without 
any further indication expressly implies that the state “discriminates on its face against 
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice Kavanaugh complained that 
Roberts’ opinion supported “a narrative of invidious religious 
discrimination”210. According to Kavanaugh, the claimant suffered the 
imposition of a worse treatment, compared to other secular activities, 
because of its religious status, and the church “would suffer irreparable 
harm from not being able to hold services on Pentecost Sunday in a way 
that comparable secular businesses and persons can conduct their 
activities”211. Even though the State of California has a compelling interest 
in combating the spread of the COVID-19, Kavanaugh said the state 
needed to provide a  
 
“compelling justification for distinguishing between (i) religious 
worship services and (ii) the litany of other secular businesses that 
are not subject to an occupancy cap;” also, the state cannot “assume 
the worst when people go to worship but assume the best when 
people go to work or go about the rest of their daily lives in permitted 
social settings”212.  
 
The Supreme Court intervention, despite its merely procedural 
nature, raised a fierce debate.  
The judges split on a crucial question, that is the role of the 
judiciary, namely whether the current health crisis requires a deferential 
attitude toward representatives of the will of specific people or whether it 
justifies a more interventionist role on the part of the judiciary, which 
would substitute its judgement in place of democratically elected 
                                                                                                                                                                       
religious conduct”. This would result in an absolute ban on religious services even 
though they respect the same guidelines that allow the reopening of secular activities. 
According to Judge Collins, religious discrimination results from the circumstance 
“that the very same people who cannot be trusted to follow the rules at their place of 
worship can be trusted to do so at their workplace and that the state cannot assume the 
worst when people go to worship but assume the best when people go to work or go 
about the rest of their daily lives in permitted social settings”. See South Bay United 
Pentecostal Church, et al., v. Gavin Newson, Governor of California, et al., No. 20-55533, United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 22 May 2020. 
210 See South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al., v. Gavin Newson, Governor of California, 
et al., 590 U.S._ (2020). It is interesting to notice that Justices Gorsuch and Thomas signed 
Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion, Justice Alito did not. See M.J. STERN, Roberts Upholds 
COVID-19 Restrictions on Churches, Scolds Kavanaugh, in Slate, 30 May 2020 
(https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/05/supreme-court-coronavirus-california-churches.htm 
l). 
211 See South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al., v. Gavin Newson, Governor of California, 
et al., 590 U.S._ (2020). 
212 See South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al., v. Gavin Newson, Governor of California, 
et al., 590 U.S._ (2020). 
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powers213. This question has not only legal, but also political implications 
as the issue concerning the “special” nature of religion is currently at the 
center of an increasing debate. In the South Bay United Pentecostal Church 
case the state asked the Court to decline to issue an injunctive order, as 
provisions were about to expire or to be replaced by more lenient 
measures214. However, Justice Roberts declined to adopt a more cautious 
approach, which would have avoided facing controversial constitutional 
issues, and felt necessary to explain, in an opinion of his own, why the 
Court dismissed the church’s claim.  
Immediately, some commentators claimed that although the Court 
is inclined to protect new rights (gay rights, abortion rights), it seems to 
adopt a self-restraint attitude when a well-established basic freedom is at 
stake215; specifically, the Chief Justice was accused of “faux judicial 
modesty”216. Commentators also raised concerns about whether such 
extensive government powers contradict the Bill of Rights, and about the 
incorporation of jurisprudence that the Supreme Court case applied to the 
state in the California case217. However, Roberts’ opinion emphasized the 
power of government officials, during a health crisis, to impose rules of 
conduct on those who elected them, thus excluding “second-guessing by 
an unelected federal judiciary”, showing, once again, that the Jacobson 
rationale is far from overruled218. It cannot be underestimated that 
although strict orders during a health crisis are generally issued without 
any explanation, the Chief Justice appears to have considered it important 
to openly and strongly reject the dissent logic, which inclines to a more 
benevolent attitude toward majority narratives (and their holidays)219.  
This decision shows, once again, a highly “ideologically polarized” 
Court220, where the Chief Justice increasingly plays the role of “the court’s 
                                                             
213 See. L GREENHOUSE, The Supreme Court, cit. 
214 See A. HOWE, Court declines to lift restrictions on crowds at church services, in 
Scotusblog, 30 May 2020 (https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/05/court-declines-to-lift-
restrictions-on-crowds-at-church-services/). 
215 See A.C. MCCARTHY, It wasn't just, cit. 
216 EDITORIAL BOARD, The Roberts rule on Churches, in WSJ, 31 May 2020 
(https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-roberts-rule-on-churches-11590959039). 
217 See A.C. MCCARTHY, It wasn't just, cit. 
218 See South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al., v. Gavin Newson, Governor of California, 
et al., 590 U.S._ (2020). 
219 See L. GREENHOUSE, The Supreme Court, cit. 
220 See M.O. DE GIROLAMI, Constitutional Contraction: Religion and the Roberts Court, 
in P. ANNICCHINO (ed.), La Corte Roberts e la tutela della libertà religiosa, European 
University Institut, Fiesole, 2017, p. 23. 
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ideological center”, often exercising the “deciding vote”221. In the 
California case, Roberts tried to reconcile his conservative attitude with his 
institutional perspective, so as to prevent the highest judicial board from 
being dragged in a political conundrum, and thereby losing its 
credibility222. However, four conservative judges, two of them appointed 
by the President, preferred to undermine public policies, using the Court’s 
powers to support an alleged religious discrimination.  
In any event, both wings of the Supreme Court appeared to start 
from the assumption that religious activities are to be put at the same level 
as secular businesses during a pandemic crisis, which indicated that the 
Smith approach is fully welcomed.  
The main difference between the two opinions seems to turn on the 
identification of the most appropriate secular comparator when assessing 
whether religious discrimination can be identified. The case, in fact, raises 
concern about secular activities to which religious gatherings have to be 
compared. The judges wondered if religious gatherings are more similar 
to grocery stores, where people stay as little time as possible, and “neither 
congregate in large groups nor remain in close proximity for extended 
periods”, or to concerts “where large groups of people gather in close 
proximity for extended periods of time”223. According to Roberts, religious 
gatherings require stricter rules than certain secular activities, such as 
shopping, banking and so on, because of the way they are conducted, 
which raises further concerns (staying in close proximity, for longer times, 
singing and speaking at worship services, all “increasing the danger” as 
people who potentially infected will “project respiratory droplets that 
contain the virus”)224. 
Consequently, during a severe health crisis a basic freedom 
enjoying constitutional protection can have severe restrictions, where its 
accommodation seems not “reasonable”. According to Roberts, absolute 
                                                             
221 See J. KRUZEL, H. NEIDING, The 7 Most Anticipated Supreme Court Decisions, in 
The Hill, 7 June 2020 (https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/501437-the-7-most-
anticipated-supreme-court-decisions); C. GRAZIANI, Libertà di culto e pandemia, cit., pp. 357-
368. 
222 According to H. HOTTERBEIN, Liberal groups black plan to expand Supreme Court, in 
Politico, 11 June 2020 (https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/11/liberal-groups-expand-
supreme-court-plan-313037), progressive organizations aim to support the appointment of 
new judges in the Supreme Court in order to weaken the conservative majority. 
223 See South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al., v. Gavin Newson, Governor of California, 
et al., 590 U.S._ (2020). 
224 See South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al., v. Gavin Newson, Governor of California, 
et al., 590 U.S._ (2020). 
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precedence has to be given to protecting health in the face of “a novel 
severe acute respiratory illness”, which has “killed [...] more 100,000 people 
nationwide”, and for which “there is no known cure, no effective 
treatment, and no vaccine”225. 
Another concern is whether this decision may have an impact on 
the views of the lower courts. However, as there is no majority opinion, 
the nature of the judgement (a request for emergency injunctive relief that 
“demands a significantly higher justification than a stay”), the varying 
restrictive measures from state to state, the absence of a clear explanation 
of the distinction among different activities, and the purpose of 
restrictions indicate that lower courts are unlikely to be strictly bound by 
the decision226. 
Two Romanian-American Christian churches in the Chicago area 
filed a similar lawsuit, asking the Supreme Court to issue a similar order 
for injunctive relief227. The churches claimed that Illinois’s stay-at-home 
and reopening plan, which imposed a 10-person limitation on worship 
services, infringed the Constitution. Specifically, they noted a crucial 
conflict of loyalty for religious adherents, who  
 
“face an impossible choice: skip [church] service[s] in violation of 
their sincere religious beliefs, or risk arrest […] or some other 
enforcement action for practicing those sincere religious beliefs”, and 
claiming that “the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even 
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable 
injury”228. 
 
In this case, the claim was founded not only on the free exercise 
clause, but also on 1) on the state RFRA (Illinois Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act)229, the express purpose of which is  
 
“to restore the compelling-interest test as set forth in [Yoder] and 
[Sherbert], and to guarantee that a test of compelling governmental 
interest will be imposed on all state [...] laws, ordinances, policies, 
procedures, practices, and governmental actions in all cases in which 
                                                             
225 See South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al., v. Gavin Newson, Governor of California, 
et al., 590 U.S._ (2020). 
226 See CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY, CENTER FOR LAW AND RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM, Covid 19 and religious freedom (https://clsreligiousfreedom.org/covid19freedom). 
227 See Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church, et al., Applicants v. J. B. Pritzker, Governor of 
Illinois, No. 19A1046, May 27, 2020. 
228 See Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church, et al., Applicants v. J. B. Pritzker, Governor of 
Illinois, cit. 
229 See Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 775, §35/1, et seq. 
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the free exercise of religion is substantially burdened [and] to provide 
a claim […]. to persons whose exercise of religion is substantially 
burdened by government”;  
 
and 2) on the establishment clause, because the government’s orders  
 
“purport to impose on Churches what worship the Governor deems 
acceptable-designating religious worship as an ‘Essential Activity’ 
but in the same provision effectively banning it except for drive-in or 
online services”230.  
 
This case seems the first time during the health crisis that the 
churches grounded their claims on the nondiscrimination provision of the 
RLUIPA. The churches claimed that the state orders were in contradiction 
with this Act, which provides that no government can  
 
“impose or implement a land use regulation that discriminates 
against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion”, when the 
orders “imposed a blanket 10-person restriction on Churches and 
religious gatherings that does not apply to other Essential Activities, 
and numerous less restrictive alternatives were available”231.  
 
They also claimed that the orders clashed also with exclusions and limits 
provision of the same Act, which provides that no government can enact a 
land use regulation “that [...] totally excludes religious assemblies from a 
jurisdiction; or […] unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions, 
or structures within a jurisdiction”, which occurs when provisions have 
“the effect of depriving both [Churches] and other religious institutions or 
assemblies of reasonable opportunities to practice their religion, including 
the use and construction of structures”232. In the Illinois case, the plaintiff 
churches claimed that  
 
“the Orders have unquestionably deprived Churches of the use of 
their facilities to host worship services with more than 10 people, 
despite Churches’ promises and ability to abide by the social 
distancing and hygiene protocols sufficient for non-religious Essential 
Activities that are not subject to numerical limit”. 
 
The Court reversed the claim with a short brief, as in the meanwhile 
the state loosened the restrictions concerning religious worship, thus 
avoiding the likelihood of facing many crucial challenges. However, the 
                                                             
230 See Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church, et al., Applicants v. J. B. Pritzker, Governor of 
Illinois, cit. 
231 See Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church, et al., Applicants v. J. B. Pritzker, Governor of 
Illinois, cit. 
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Court left open the possibility that the churches could file a new motion 
“if circumstances warrant”233.  
 
 
13 - “Religious America” and “secular” Italy during COVID-19 phase 
one 
 
At first glance, analysis contrasts, on the one hand, a “religious America” 
where religious exemptions were extensively provided at a state level 
during the early part pandemic crisis (even though with the introduction 
of size limits and precautionary measures), with, on the other hand, a 
“secular” Italy where some forms of collective exercise of religious 
freedom were, at least during phase one, denied234.  
We could argue that in Italy, religion was not considered “special 
enough” to justify accommodation during the phase one of the health 
crisis. The Italian constitutional framework founded on church-state 
cooperation and the usual recognition of a high level of church autonomy 
did not influence the implementation of the precautionary measures, 
resulting in a severe suspension of the collective exercise of religious 
freedom. In the United States, however, lawmakers tried to balance health 
protection and religious accommodation more accurately so as to avoid 
discriminatory treatment of religious liberty when compared to that 
treatment of secular activities.  
However, such analysis seems to contradict the usual stereotypical 
legal understanding of both systems: the United States as a model where 
church state relationships are founded on church-state separation (the so-
called wall of separation) and Italy as a legal system where church-state 
relationships are ruled by bilateral agreements with the Catholic Church 
and the other religious denominations that are deeply rooted in the 
country. 
Nevertheless, the situation is more complex than that, and different 
judicial reactions are affected by many things, which in turn leads to the 
dynamism of legal systems, which are affected by internal and external 
sociopolitical changes.  
                                                             
233 See Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church, et al., Applicants v. J. B. Pritzker, Governor of 
Illinois, cit.: “The application for injunctive relief presented to Justice Kavanaugh and by 
him referred to the Court is denied. The Illinois Department of Public Health issued new 
guidance on May 28. The denial is without prejudice to Applicants filing a new motion 
for appropriate relief if circumstances warrant”. 
234 See P. BERGER, G. DAVIS, E. FOCAS, Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme 
and Variations, Ashgate, Farnham-Burtlington (VT), 2008. 
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In both legal systems, regardless of the established models of 
church-state relationships- be they separationist or cooperative-the 
pandemic crisis emphasized underlying judicial, political, sociocultural, 
and economic challenges, giving rise to a tension between competing 
rights and exacerbating concerns about the “special” role of religion 
(“exceptionalism”235 in the United States, the “primacy”236 in Italy), which 
continues to be the object of increasing debate. Plus such tension gave rise 
to further questions concerning the crucial interrelationship between law, 
religion, and COVID-19.  
 
 
14 - Management of religious freedom during the pandemic and the lack 
or presence of a statute governing religious freedom  
 
In both legal systems, in recent months the pandemic crisis emphasized 
the crucial question of “what degree” of religious freedom can be granted 
and the inadequacy of actual frameworks, which are increasingly subject 
to the complex dynamics between majority consent and minority claims, 
with democratic process leaving the latter dissatisfied, even though for 
different reasons237. 
A key question is whether the presence or the lack of a statute 
governing religious freedom affected the management of the exercise of 
religious freedom during the pandemic in either or both countries. 
For many years, the lack of updated legislative provisions aimed at 
bridging the gap between constitutional guarantees and increasingly 
pluralist demands for religious freedom and at finalizing the 
implementation of the constitutional framework has strongly affected the 
Italian model of church-state relationships238. Unfortunately, the robust 
                                                             
235 See D.R. HOOVER (ed.), Religion and American Exceptionalism, cit. 
236 See S. BERLINGÒ, Fonti del diritto ecclesiastico, in S. BERLINGÒ, G. 
CASUSCELLI, S. DOMIANELLO, Le fonti e i principi di diritto ecclesiastico, Giappichelli, 
Torino, 2000, p. 3. 
237 See A. MADERA, Nuove forme di obiezione di coscienza, cit., p. 1, and its 
bibliographical references; D.O. CONKLE, Religion, Law and the Constitution, LEG, St. 
Paul, 2016; J.A. NICHOLS, J. WITTE JR., National Report Unites States of America: Religious 
Law and Religious Courts as a Challenge to the State, in U. KISCHEL (ed.) Religious Law and 
Religious Courts as a Challenge to the State. Legal Pluralism in Comparative Perspective, Verlag 
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2016, p. 83.  
238 See A. MADERA, La definizione della nozione di religione ed il ruolo della 
giurisprudenza: una comparazione fra l’ordinamento statunitense e quello italiano, in Anuario de 
Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado, vol. 34, 2018, p. 563, and its bibliographical referencespp.  
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academic and judicial debate concerning the “substantive” nature of 
Article 19 of the Constitution underestimated its inability to cover the 
various demands for positive religious freedom and to make the exercise 
of religious freedom effective, without a law filling in the details of the 
constitutional framework239. 
The historical lack (despite several political attempts to produce 
bills, which never received final approval) of a unilateral statute providing 
a basic level of religious freedom to every religious community resulted in 
the overexpansion of the use of bilateral negotiations, the borders of which 
risk becoming increasingly blurred and overlapping with matters that 
should be governed unilaterally by lawmakers240. This overexpansion 
resulted in the development of a peculiar methodological path: on one 
hand, bilaterality, with revitalization of the agreements as the means to 
guarantee protection of a basic level of religious freedom (resulting in the 
approval of further agreements with other religious groups, and thus 
increasing the inequality of the treatment of groups which do not enjoy 
agreements); on the other hand, unilaterality, with the increasing number 
of draft laws regulating only specific aspects of religious freedom, in the 
pursuit of skeptical (“repressive”) solutions (burqas, places of woship)241. 
This model of church-state relationships emphasized the risk of a 
secularism resulting in a “multi-denominationalism” that will provide a 
privileged regime only to religious groups that reach an agreement with 
the State, but also in a kind of “neo-separatism” for those groups whose 
demands for protection of religious freedom are not met242. The current 
                                                             
239 See G. AMATO, Prefazione. La libertà di coscienza e di religione, in R. ZACCARIA, S. 
DOMIANELLO, A. FERRARI, P. FLORIS, R. MAZZOLA (eds.), La legge che non c’è. Proposta per 
una legge sulla libertà religiosa in Italia, il Mulino, Bologna, 2019, p. 9; S. DOMIANELLO, Il 
matrimonio e le intese, ivi, p. 200. 
240 Regarding this perspective, some academics warn about the increasing confusion 
between the religious nature of entities that claim religious protection, which does not 
unavoidably imply resorting to the stipulation of agreements, and the matters that 
should be bilaterally ruled. See S. DOMIANELLO, Libertà religiosa tra bilateralità 
necessaria, diffusa e impropria, in A. FUCCILLO (ed.), Le proiezioni civili delle religioni, cit., pp. 
43-45; G. CASUSCELLI, Il pluralismo in materia religiosa nell’attuazione della Costituzione ad 
opera del legislatore repubblicano, in S. DOMIANELLO (ed.), Diritto e religione in Italia, cit., p. 
28. 
241 See R. ZACCARIA, Il gruppo di studio e il metodo di lavoro, in R. ZACCARIA, S. 
DOMIANELLO, A. FERRARI, P. FLORIS, R. MAZZOLA (eds.), La legge che non c’è, cit., pp. 19-22. 
242 See G. CASUSCELLI, S. DOMIANELLO, Intese con le confessioni religiose diverse 
dalla cattolica, in S. BERLINGO, G. CASUSCELLI, S. DOMIANELLO, Le fonti e i principi 
di diritto ecclesiastico, cit., pp. 33-40; see S. DOMIANELLO, Libertà religiosa tra bilateralità 
necessaria, diffusa e impropria, cit., p. 51. 
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status quo has increased the perception, in the eyes of religious 
denominations, of an agreement with the State as the only guard able to 
protect religious freedom, and has generated an increasing trend to seek 
an agreement so as to be protected against forms of discrimination rather 
than to enjoy a specific safeguard of their own “identity features”243.  
The pandemic emphasized this debate, giving rise to questions, 
both old and new, about whether the government acted properly during 
the pandemic, whether it dealt properly with religious communities, and 
whether the lack of a unilateral statute governing religious freedom 
affected in some way government’s implementation of religious pluralism 
during the health crisis. Although the Italian model of church-state 
relationships is that of “multilevel” protection of religious freedom, the 
pandemic emergency increased concerns about the proper legal vehicles to 
protect the basic aspects at the core of the protection of religious freedom 
of all religious groups, in both its individual and collective dimensions244. 
Basic protection cannot be subject to further “filters” (namely, agreements 
with the State) that give rise to “asymmetric” treatment of different 
religious groups, and to an underestimation of the increasing demands for 
visibility by new religious-ideological subjects245. 
Academics specifically deplored, even in phase two, a low level of 
government solicitude toward the issue of religion, which comes from the 
lack of a proper updated “church-state politics”, able to properly replace 
the bilateral technique, and the lack of a “control room” devoted to 
religious freedom; the latter would have allowed more effective 
participation and contribution by all religious actors in the development of 
appropriate policies during the health crisis246.  
The signature, in May 2020, of several protocols with different 
religious groups, allowing them to resume religious celebrations provided 
that precautionary measures are respected, gave rise to other academic 
comment247. Academics are in divided over the almost identical content of 
                                                             
243 See N. COLAIANNI, Ateismo de combat e Intesa con lo Stato, in Rivista AIC, 4/2014, 
p. 15; A. MADERA, La definizione della nozione di religione, cit., p. 563, and its 
bibliographical references. 
244 See A. LICASTRO, La Corte Costituzionale torna protagonista dei processi di transizione 
della politica ecclesiastica italiana?, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., 26/2016, p. 
26. 
245 See N. COLAIANNI, La libertà di culto, cit., p. 33; G. MACRI, La libertà religiosa, cit., 
p. 36. 
246 See A. FERRARI, CEI: Un’occasione mancata, in Settimana News, April 29, 2020, 
http://www.settimananews.it/diritto/cei-unoccasione-mancata/. 
247 Protocolli per le celebrazioni delle confessioni religiose diverse dalla cattolica, in Diresom, 
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these memorandums (access to places of worship, religious ceremonies, 
size requirements, social distancing, identification of a responsible person 
for the respect of the measures in every place of worship, sanitation of 
spaces and objects, option of services in open spaces if the place of 
worship cannot respect the measures). According to some academic, 
protocols are inherently limited, as they duplicate the experience of the 
“photocopy agreements”248, and the State did not take advantage of the 
current opportunity to provide a “general space of negotiation” in which 
all religious groups could freely join249. According to other academics, 
these protocols must be considered a positive step toward a fully 
pluralistic legal framework for all religious groups250. Although the main 
public concern remains that of public health, the government 
accommodated the common need of all religious denominations to resume 
religious gatherings, making some room for certain specific features 
(relating in the main, to liturgical aspects); in addition, religious 
communities showed their commitment to contributing to the 
implementation of the health measures and to reconciling their religious 
practices with the exceptional situation of the pandemic, in the pursuit of a 
fair balance between “freedom” and “responsibility”251.  
However, the intent of the protocols is not to recognize specific 
features of some religious groups. Surely the response to the pandemic is 
outside the issue of church-state relationships. However, the government 
made use of the language of conciliation and cooperation with religious 
entities, to promote a fair balance between the collective exercise of 
religious freedom and the preservation of public health, within a 
constitutional framework that requires the protection of fundamental 
rights and the fulfillment of the duty of social solidarity both to 
                                                                                                                                                                       
May 15, 2020 (https://diresom.net/2020/05/15/protocolli-per-le-clebrazioni-delle-confessioni-
religiose-diverse-dalla-cattolica/). 
248 See G. MACRÌ, Brevi considerazioni in materia di governance delle pratiche di culto tra 
istanze egualitarie, soluzioni compiacenti e protocolli (quasi) “fotocopia”, in Stato, Chiese e 
pluralismo confessionale, cit., 11/2020, p. 75. 
249 See G. MACRÌ, Brevi considerazioni, cit., pp. 72-74.  
250 See M.L. LO GIACCO, I “Protocolli per la ripresa delle celebrazioni delle confessioni 
diverse dalla cattolica”: una nuova stagione nella politica ecclesiastica italiana, in Stato, Chiese e 
pluralismo confessionale, cit., 12/2020, p. 108. 
251 See P. CONSORTI, Esercizi di laicità, cit.; L.M. GUZZO, Riprendono anche i riti non 
cattolici. Per la prima volta accordi con islamici e confessioni senza intesa. Intervista al Prof. 
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individuals and collective entities252, thus developing new forms of 
“dialogue”253. So religious communities seem involved, as social actors 
committed to the pursuit of the material and spiritual development of 
society254. 
In the United States, the two negative provisions of the First 
Amendment ban the government from enforcing laws that would amount 
to a state establishment of religion and would, as well, prohibit the free 
exercise of religion.  
 
“According to the judicial readings of these clauses, state interference 
and ‘excessive entanglement’ in church matters are therefore 
prohibited; and the churches are traditionally exempted from certain 
generally applicable laws”255.  
 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution requires neutrality 
“not only toward religion, but also among religions”256. Both the 
lawmakers and the judiciary make use of the “language of religious 
accommodation”257, which shows the propensity of public actors to 
modify general rules in order to mitigate the kind of “disability” suffered 
by minority groups that disagree with majority narratives258.  
As the United States follow the common law tradition, its legal 
system has a more skeptical attitude toward legislation dealing with 
religion than the Italian legal system, and its judiciary assumes the key 
                                                             
252 See P. CONSORTI, Esercizi di laicità, cit.; A. TIRA, Normativa emergenziale, cit. 
253 See M.L. LO GIACCO, The dialogue between States and Religious Groups, paper 
presented at the DIRESOM webinar “Law and Religion at the Time of Covid-19”, 24 June 
2020. 
254 See A. TIRA, Normativa emergenziale, cit. 
255 See A. MADERA, Clerical Sexual Abuses and Church’s Civil Responsibility: A 
Comparative Analysis of American and Italian Case Law, in Journal of Church and State, vol. 
62/1, 2020, p. 63, and its bibliographical references; W.W. BASSETT, W.C. DURHAM, 
R.T. SMITH, Religious Organizations and the Law, Thomson Reuters, St. Paul, 2013, pp 11-
21; A. CARMELLA, The Protection of Children and Young People: Catholic and Constitutional 
Visions of Responsible Freedom, in Boston College Law Review, vol. 44, 2003, p. 1036. 
256 See L.H. GREENHAW, M.H. KOBY, Constitutional Conversations and New Religious 
Movements, in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 38, 2005, p. 677. 
257 Cfr. L. G. BEAMAN, “It Was All Slightly Unreal”: What’s Wrong with Tolerance and 
Accommodation in the Adjudication of Religious Freedom?, in Can. J. Women & L., vol. 23, 
2011, pp. 443-445.  
258 A. MADERA, Il porto dei simboli religiosi nel contesto giudiziario, in Stato, Chiese e 
pluralismo confessionale, cit., 4/2020, pp. 82-93; K. ALIDADI, Religion, Equality and 
Employment in Europe. The Case for Reasonable Accommodation, Bloomsbury, Oxford-
Portland (OR), 2017. 
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role of “judicial interpretation” in completing the constitutional 
framework259. The only federal attempt to provide a unitary regulatory 
framework concerning religious freedom was the enactment of the RFRA, 
which included a type of general clause accommodating religious 
freedom. This attempt to severely limit the Smith logic (which was 
intended to promote only specific legislative exemptions) and to force an 
alternative reading260 resulted in the RFRA being declared 
unconstitutional because it applied to state and local governments, it 
exceeded the congressional powers under section 5 of the 14th 
Amendment, and did not satisfy the standards of proportionality and 
congruency261. Since then, Congress avoided “push[ing] the limits of its 
congressional power”, because of the high risk of “invalidation”, and 
preferred an attitude of “inaction”, even though it can exercise an 
influence on “other actors” in other more “cautious and creative ways” 
(i.e., through its spending powers), and thus indirectly affect state 
legislative choices and the legislators’ understanding of religious 
freedom262.  
The health crisis simply brought to surface the abovementioned 
underlying crisis in relation to religious freedom, namely that nowadays 
religious freedom is mainly entrusted to the interplay between federal and 
state statutes, that define its spaces and its limits, which leads to a high 
risk of implementation of different degrees of religious freedom in 
different contexts or matters. The current pandemic highlights a sharp 
statutory and judicial division in relation to which secular exceptions 
religious conducts should be compared (essential or non-essential 
activities), which could lead to discrimination against religious activities 
where those activities are not granted the same accommodation as secular 
businesses. It is to be noticed that successful religious claims about health-
protections measures occurred in states with some kind of RFRA, which 
the courts relied upon as a legal basis for accepting the claims263.  
                                                             
259 See L.H. GREENHAW, M.H. KOBY, Constitutional Conversations, cit., p. 670. 
260 See D.O. CONKLE, Congressional Alternatives, cit., p. 638. 
261 See D.O. CONKLE, Congressional Alternatives, cit., p. 683. The abovementioned 
Boerne decision in 1997 clarified that only “preventive or remedial legislation” can pass 
“judicial review”. According to the author, congressional remedial legislation includes 
“procedural” legislation or laws concerning specific areas of state and local regulation 
where there is an high risk of “purposeful” religious discrimination. 
262 See D.O. CONKLE, Congressional Alternatives, cit., pp. 683-688. 
263 See CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY, CENTER FOR LAW AND RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM, Covid 19 and religious freedom, cit. As an example, see Maryville Baptist Church, 
Inc. v. Beshear, No. 20-5427 (6th Cir. 2020) (where the court held that the plaintiffs had 
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Therefore, the pandemic emphasized that in a health crisis 
enhanced federal and state synergic action would provide more viable 
strategies to balance individual liberties and the preservation of common 
good in ways consistent with the federal constitutional framework. 
 
 
15 - Effect of the pandemic on the question of whose religious freedom 
should be protected  
 
The legal scenario is firmly connected with the question of “whose” 
religious freedom has to be protected. In Italy, the most crucial challenge 
is the implementation of a more effective religious pluralism, consistent 
with the constitutional provisions that promote an equal freedom for all 
religious groups and a wide recognition of the collective dimension of 
religion, so as to satisfy demands for religious freedom of all faith 
communities, and thus providing a fairer balance between unilateral and 
bilateral rules264. The current legal situation indicates that some faith 
communities enjoy a higher level of religious freedom, which in turn 
signals “promotional measures” for some religions, while other religious 
groups are subject to treatment based on hostility and “political 
discretion”265. The management of religious pluralism is increasingly 
complex because of the growing presence of new religious groups (e.g., 
the migration of adherents of Islam), which claim both integration in host 
societies, and accommodation for a “deeper” kind of religious diversity266, 
but do not have a unitary representative body (because of their non-
monolithic nature). The presence of small faith communities and of groups 
of nonbelievers, which do not have features of religious denominations, 
even though claiming some form of constitutional protection of their 
                                                                                                                                                                       
good chances of being successful with their claims founded on the Kentucky RFRA); On 
Fire Christian Center, Inc. v. Fischer, No. 3:20-cv-264 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 11, 2020) (where 
Kentucky’s RFRA was identified as one of the fundamental legal elements on which the 
church was expected to triumph in litigation); First Baptist Church v. Kelly, cit. (where the 
court relied on both First Amendment grounds, but petitioners also founded their claims 
on the Kansas RFRA). 
264 See G. MACRÌ, La libertà religiosa, cit., p. 42; P. CONSORTI, Esercizi di laicità, cit. 
265 See G. CASUSCELLI, “Volendo togliere ogni dubbio …”, in R. ZACCARIA, S. 
DOMIANELLO, A. FERRARI, P. FLORIS, R. MAZZOLA (eds.), La legge che non c’è, cit., p. 262. 
266 See K. ALIDADI, M.-C. FOBLETS, Framing Multicultural Challenges in Freedom of 
Religion Terms: Limitation of Minimal Rights for Managing Religious Diversity in Europe, in 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, vol. 30, 2012, 389. 
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organizational dimension, further complicates the issue267. In Italy, a 
group of academics produced a law proposal that distinguishes between 
religious denominations and religious associations268. This proposal 
promotes the organizational dimension of religious freedom, in view of 
the implementation of a “multilevel” system of protection of religious 
freedom269. In this way, new associative realities would enjoy protection 
against discrimination, but also their claims of “public visibility” would 
receive proper consideration270 . 
The incomplete framework affected the management of the exercise 
of religious freedom during the pandemic. 
During phase one of the pandemic, as it is well known, “the virus 
was religiously neutral”271 and equally affected the exercise of religious 
freedom of all religious groups. However, during phase two, a more 
immediate responsiveness to the needs of the Catholic Church was seen, 
which found support in that the State found the precautionary measures 
proposed by the Catholic Church to be adequate. However, the 
government collected the input from many academis about the 
implementation of a more pluralist response272. This resulted, first, in an 
assembly of all religious denominations (not only those that enjoyed an 
agreement with the State)273 and the Ministry of Internal Affairs to seek a 
common protocol about safe resumption of religious gatherings, and 
second, in the signature of Protocols with several religious groups aimed 
at the resumption of religious rituals and practices, but respecting of 
                                                             
267 See G. AMATO, Prefazione, cit., 11. 
268 See G. AMATO, Prefazione, cit., 12. 
269 A. LICASTRO, La Corte Costituzionale, cit., p. 26. 
270 See A. FERRARI, Le linee generali della Proposta di legge sulla libertà di coscienza e di 
religione, in R. ZACCARIA, S. DOMIANELLO, A. FERRARI, P. FLORIS, R. MAZZOLA (eds.), La 
legge che non c’è, cit., pp. 57-103. 
271 See. A. FERRARI, Covid-19 e libertà religiosa, cit. 
272 See DIRESOM, Position Paper. Proposal for a Safe Resumption of Religious Ceremonies, 
in Diresom, 27 April 2020, https://diresomnet.files.wordpress.com/2020/04/position-
paper_diresom-1.pdf; A. FERRARI, CEI: Un’occasione mancata, cit.; A. FUCCILLO, M. ABU 
SALEM, L. DECIMO, Fede interdetta? L’esercizio della libertà religiosa collettiva durante 
l’emergenza COVID-19: attualità e prospettive, in Calumet, Intercultural Law and Humanities 
Review, 4 April 2020 (http://www.windogem.it/calumet/upload/pdf/mat_97.pdf). 
273 All the Protocols in their preamble provide that “the need to adopt measures to 
contain the epidemiological emergency from SARS-CoV-2 makes it necessary to draft a 
protocol with religious denominations. The Protocol, in respect of the right to freedom of 
worship, is independent of the existence of bilateral agreements, reconciling the exercise 
of religious freedom with the needs to contain the ongoing epidemic”. 
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health measures274. As the range of the recipients of public positive 
“responses” has been extended, this can be seen as a first step toward a 
multi-lateral system of church-state relationships in a key dialogue with 
religious communities275. The hope is that this experience of “open 
consultation”276 (which is strictly connected to a specific topic and to 
specific exceptional circumstances) is a new model of cooperation between 
religious and secular powers in the spirit of the principles of secularism, 
democracy and religious pluralism277. 
As to U.S. legal context, the pandemic emphasized the issue of a 
recent controversial promotion of the abovementioned “expansive” 
reading of religious freedom278. For this reason, “whose” religious 
freedom has to be protected is increasingly a crucial issue.  
Although some academics saw state RFRAs as a potentially fruitful 
chance to implement religious freedom, others emphasized the risk of 
minority communities being increasingly vulnerable, as “politically 
influential religious groups” would have more opportunities to “distort 
the laws in favor of their preferences and needs”279. An emblematic 
example is the wide meaning given to the expression “person” in both 
federal and state RFRAs, which allows an extremely politically divisive 
judicial extension of religious rights to some classes of for-profit 
corporations280. The democratic processes that Justice Scalia, in Smith, 
confidently saw as a proper solution to the issue of religious exemptions 
was not an effective workable compromise, as it gave rise not only to a 
“relative disadvantage”, but also a disproportionate burden for 
uncommon religious practices281.  
                                                             
274 See P. CONSORTI, Esercizi di laicità, cit.; M.L. LO GIACCO, I “Protocolli per la 
ripresa delle celebrazioni delle confessioni diverse dalla cattolica”: una nuova stagione nella 
politica ecclesiastica italiana, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., 12/2020, p. 110. 
275 See G. MACRÌ, Brevi considerazioni, cit., 73-77.  
276 See M.L. LO GIACCO, I Protocolli, cit., p. 113. 
277 See G. CASUSCELLI, paper presented at the webinar “La libertà religiosa in Italia ai 
tempi del COVID-19”, cit.; G. MACRÌ, La libertà religiosa, p. 31. 
278 See Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al., v. Hobby Lobby Stores, cit. 
See also P. HORWITZ, The Hobby Lobby Moment, in Harvard Law Review, vol. 128, 2014, p. 
1. 
279 See C. BARNER-BARRY, Contemporary Paganism: Minority Religions in a 
Majoritarian America, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2005, 21. 
280 See Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al., v. Hobby Lobby Stores, cit.; 
See A. MADERA, Spunti di riflessione, cit., p. 695, and its bibliographical references. 
281 See Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 890 (1990): “But that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be 
 
124 
Rivista telematica (https://www.statoechiese.it), fascicolo n. 16 del 2020               ISSN 1971- 8543 
In principle, the U.S. non-preferentialism allows religious claims on 
both the “ends of the political spectrum” (conservative and 
progressive)282. However, in an era where “cultural wars” are expanding, 
claims for religious accommodation concern not only minority groups, but 
also, increasingly, majority groups, as the accommodation is seen a means 
of protection of values and convictions that are becoming progressively 
politically divisive in a highly secularized and multicultural society283.  
The growing number of demands for religious exemptions by the 
abovementioned “new” religious actors (as faith-based businesses) is 
making religious accommodation an increasingly unmanageable matter 
and leading to an heightened critical attitude on the part of the general 
public toward religious accommodation, thus raising concerns about 
discrimination and inequality284. Recent Supreme Court case law 
weakened the substantial burden parameter, which traditionally required 
a petitioner to show that a law caused a substantial burden to their 
religious practice, compelling them to contravene a religious rule285. 
Furthermore, there is a growing perception by the general public of 
religious organizations as “small businesses”, which have increasing 
access to federal funding and are granted religious exemptions, which in 
turn this gives rise to strong arguments by opponents of religious 
accommodation who want secular and religious organizations to be 
treated the same way, as “you cannot have your cake and eat it too”. 
Demands for an equal treatment of all religious ethical-philosophical 
beliefs and convictions are expanding, in light of a progressive diminution 
                                                                                                                                                                       
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges 
weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs”. 
282 C.M. CORBIN, A Religious Right to Disregard Mandatory Ultrasounds, in 
Canopyforum, 1 April 2020 (https://canopyforum.org/2020/04/01/a-religious-right-to-disregard-
mandatory-ultrasounds/). 
283 See A. MADERA, Spunti di riflessione, cit., p. 694, and its bibliographical references; 
D. LAYCOCK; Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, in University of Illinois Law Review, 3, 
2014, p. 839 ff.; D. NEJAIME, R. SIEGEL, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience in 
Religion and Politics, in The Yale Law Journal, vol. 124, 2015, p. 2516; F.M. GEDICKS, 
American Church-State Relations and the Culture Wars : A New Phase ?, in Quad. Dir. Pol. 
Eccl., vol. 23, 2/2015, p. 325 ff. 
284 See A. MADERA, Spunti di riflessione, cit., pp. 695-709, and its bibliographical 
references; I.C. LUPU, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, in 
Harvard Journal of Law and Gender, vol. 38, 2015, pp. 14-23.  
285 The Hobby Lobby decision held kinds of “attenuated” and “indirect” burdens on 
religious freedom to be “substantial”, dramatically expanding the range of religious 
objection. See C.M. CORBIN, A Religious Right to Disregard Mandatory Ultrasounds, cit. 
 
125 
Rivista telematica (https://www.statoechiese.it), fascicolo n. 16 del 2020               ISSN 1971- 8543 
of religious “exceptionalism”286 and an equal treatment of secular and 
religious interests287.  
The health crisis has catalyzed the politically divisive issue of 
religious freedom, namely whether religious freedom is special enough to 
deserve exceptional protection in the light of the U.S. constitutional 
framework, and what are the limits of constitutional coverage288. During 
the pandemic, the most rooted religious groups seemed more prone to 
litigating their rights than the smaller or newer groups, although all 
religious groups were subject to the same restrictions. The crucial question 
is whether and to what extent numerical data and grounding of religious 
groups influenced the result of judicial debate. 
The pandemic made clear the need to redefine the standards of 
judicial review. The abovementioned Smith rationale, is that religious 
organizations deserve accommodation only when they are targeted 
because of their religious beliefs, and when compared to secular 
organization289.  
The debate about “how much” religious freedom opens another 
question: whether religious organizations’ access to government funding 
for organizations that suffered economic loss during the pandemic is on a 
                                                             
286 See D.R. HOOVER (ed.), Religion and American Exceptionalism, cit. 
287 See M. SCHWARTZMAN, What If Religion Isn’t Special? in University of Chicago Law 
Review, vol. 79, 2012, pp. 1351-1427; B. LEITER, Why Tolerate Religion ? Princeton 
University Press, Princeton-Oxford, 2013, pp. 100-101; A. MADERA, Dealing with 
Atheism: una lettura alternative dei rapporti fra Stato e Confessioni nell’ordinamento 
statunitense, in Quad. Dir. Pol. Eccl., vol. 27, 3/2019, pp. 851-881, and its bibliographical 
references; A. MADERA, Spunti di riflessione, cit., p. 710, and its bibliographical 
references. 
288 We have to take into account that the claims of faith-based businesses even during 
this period, are exacerbating the skepticism about religious exemptions. See Kingdom 
Kuts, et al., v. Anthony s. Evers, Case No. 1:20-cv-0723, United States District Court Eastern 
District of Wisconsin Northern Division. In this case the owners of a business activity, 
(hair salon), claiming a faith-based identity, claimed that the emergency order imposing 
closure of non-essential business activities violated their rights to exercise of religious 
freedom and religious assembly and asked the “Court to issue a Temporary Restraining 
Order restraining and enjoining the Defendants, and all other persons in active concert or 
participation with them, from enforcing, attempting to enforce, threatening to enforce, or 
otherwise requiring compliance with the ORDERS or any other order to the extent any 
such order prohibits Plaintiffs from exercising their constitutional rights”. 
289 According to L. GOODRICH, Wedding Vendors’ Messy Battle for Religious Liberty, in 
World, 5 May 2020 (https://world.wng.org/content/wedding_vendors_messy_battle_for_religious 
_liberty), a compromise solution could be granted by resorting to free speech rights: in 
this case the more “religiously expressive” is the business, the more it cannot be 
“compelled” to participate in “expression” it disagrees with. 
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par with secular institutions and is consistent with both the clauses of the 
First Amendment290.  
Indeed, parties to cases during the health crisis emphasized the 
need for the Supreme Court to revisit Smith, arguing that the judiciary, in 
managing many RFRA cases, has sufficiently demonstrated that it is 
“entirely capable of balancing claims for religious accommodation against 
governmental interests”291. The pandemic increased academic awareness 
that  
 
“by leaving protection of religious minorities to the vicissitudes of 
majoritarian rule, the Smith rule undermines a core motivation for 
adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: protection of the religious 
exercises of minority religions”292.  
 
In February 2020, the Supreme Court accepted a petition of 
certiorari in the case of Fulton v. City of Philadelphia293. So the Court will 
have to assess whether the Smith rationale can be revised, given its 
unsatisfactory results in the long term294. In the future, the traditional U.S. 
non-preferential attitude about religion could develop in two directions: 
deny any religious exemption for all religious organizations or expanding 
equally the protection grounded on the free exercise clause295.  
 
                                                             
290 Many houses of worship and religiously-affiliated schools applied for the Paycheck 
Protection Program, a federal program giving financial support to small businesses 
suffering from the impact of COVID-19, had their applications approved, and received 
loans to “keep the employees on their payrolls”. See C. CAPATIDES, More than 12,000 
Catholic churches in the U.S. applied for PPP loans and 9,000 got them, in CBS News, 8 May 
2020 (https://www.cbsnews.com/news/catholic-churches-paycheck-protection-program-12000-
applied-9000-got/). 
291 See Ricks v. Idaho Contracting Board, on petition for a writ of certiorari to the Idaho 
Court of Appeals, n. 19-66. Brief for Amici Curiae General Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists, Church of God in Christ, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, and 
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America in support of Petitioner. 
292 See Ricks v. Idaho Contracting Board, on petition for a writ of certiorari to the Idaho 
Court of Appeals, n. 19-66. Brief for Amici Curiae Ten Legal Scholars in Support of 
Petitioner. 
293 Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), Cert. Granted, 24 February 
2020. The case is about the exclusion of a religious agency from the city’s foster care 
system unless the agency committed to act and speak in a way incoherent with its 
religious convictions about marriage.  
294 See V.C. BRANNON, Banning Religious Assemblies, cit., pp. 1-5.  
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16 - Guaranteeing a fair level of religious accommodation during a 
pandemic 
 
A further element of concern is “who” is in charge of the task of 
guaranteeing a fair level of religious accommodation. In both legal 
systems, the constitutional text “sets the parameters of the constitutional 
conversation” about religious freedom296. The complex dynamics between 
legislative and jurisprudential sources have a deep impact on the 
framework used by those in charge of public choices during a pandemic. 
The crucial question of whether and to what extent the “tension between 
new religious perspectives and established norms can be negotiated in a 
[…] courtroom setting” and whether and to what degree judicial decisions 
“are able to affect the governing legal standards” is the object of on-going 
debate and processes297. 
Italy’s civil law system has a “multilevel”298 system of protection of 
religious freedom, often resulting in a disparate treatment of, and a 
“distinctive voice” for, certain faith groups299. Italian constitutional 
provisions provide a “more detailed structure” than the United States’ 
First Amendment negative injunctions300. The Italian system provides the 
potential for cooperative relationships, and guarantees the individual and 
collective dimension of religious freedom, specifying possible limitations 
to religious freedom and autonomy301. Although the Constitution 
guarantees equal freedom and nondiscrimination for all religious groups, 
and strictly confines limitations to the exercise of religious freedom, there 
exist different legal regimes governing the rights, privileges and benefits 
for certain religious groups, depending on the agreement a particular 
group has with the State.  
According to civil law tradition, the constitutional text implies that 
legislation is “sufficiently clear, coherent and complete to make it 
unnecessary for courts to create precedent”302. However, given the 
absence of a uniform law governing the protection of religious freedom of 
                                                             
296 See L. HUNT GREENHAW, M. H. KOBY, Constitutional Conversations, cit., p. 619. 
297 See L. HUNT GREENHAW, M. H. KOBY, Constitutional Conversations, cit., p. 618. 
298 See A. LICASTRO, La Corte Costituzionale, cit., p. 26. 
299 See L. HUNT GREENHAW, M. H. KOBY, Constitutional Conversations, cit., p. 675. 
300 See L. HUNT GREENHAW, M. H. KOBY, Constitutional Conversations, cit., p. 671. 
301 See L. HUNT GREENHAW, M. H. KOBY, Constitutional Conversations, cit., pp. 670- 
671. 
302 See V. FERRERES COMELLA, The European Model of Constitutional Review of 
Legislation: Toward Decentralization, in Int’L J. Const. L., vol. 2, 2004, p. 463. 
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all religious denominations, the courts (in particular, the Constitutional 
Court) are increasingly charged with the duty to “lead a difficult 
transition” toward a fairer allocation of such primary commodity 
(religious freedom) and to enhance the search for new viable forms of 
protection and to balance fundamental rights303. The Constitutional Court 
has been progressively charged with the task of implementing the 
constitutional text, so as to remove the contradictions between the 
constitutional charter and the old law about “tolerated religions” and 
ruling on new religious demands case by case304. In any event, the 
“centralized” constitutional control leads to less dynamism in the 
“constitutional conversation”,, fewer actors participating in it, less power 
for religious actors to “negotiate legal meanings” and to promote a 
“competing narrative” in litigation and more “predictability” of results, 
compared to the U.S. common law system305. During the pandemic up to 
late June 2020 the Constitutional Court did not have the opportunity to 
address the choices of public policies adopted to deal with the health 
crisis, as did the court in the United States, Germany and France306. 
The ECHR enriches the “constitutional conversation” and “centers” 
the debate on human rights and their “enforcement” in national contexts, 
increasing the opportunities to give renewed meaning to constitutional 
texts and making these texts more “responsive” to minority claims307. Its 
importance should not be underestimated. During the pandemic, the 
language of the ECHR has sought the endorsement of the “common 
standard of proportionality” between the means used and the pursued 
aims; it also showed concern about “the rights and the freedoms of 
others”308.  
However, in Italy, church-state agreements have not been 
counterbalanced by a general law that guarantees a basic level of religious 
freedom to all faith communities and seeks to limit the discretion of the 
                                                             
303 See A. LICASTRO, La Corte Costituzionale, cit., p. 32.  
304 See G. CASUSCELLI, “Volendo togliere ogni dubbio …”, cit., p. 262. 
305 See L. HUNT GREENHAW, M. H. KOBY, Constitutional Conversations, cit., pp. 668-
669 and 677. 
306 See Bundesverfassungsgericht 29 April 2020 - 1 BvQ 44; Conseil d’État, ord. 18 May 
2020, nn. 440366, 440380, 440410, 440531, 440550, 440562, 440563, 440590. 
307 See L. HUNT GREENHAW, M. H. KOBY, Constitutional Conversations, cit., p. 650 
and p. 675. 
308 See A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto, cit., p. 561, and its 
bibliographical references; A. RUGGERI, Dialogo fra le Corti e tecniche decisorie, a tutela dei 
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executive branch. Here, again, the pandemic emphasizes that the lack of 
general updated law about religious freedom makes it more difficult to 
reach the correct balance between equality (which should be guaranteed to 
all religious groups) and specific differences (which are safeguarded by 
bilateral agreements only for some faith communities), a balance that 
would guarantee legislative standards and thus avoid fluctuations in the 
outcome of judicial review and excessive government discretion and 
would establish general principles leading the regulation of matters 
covered by concurring legislative powers vested in the Regions309. The 
pandemic crisis offers a unique opportunity for democratic processes to 
reclaim their role as the main driver of the implementation of positive 
secularism310. 
In the United States, the Supreme Court has a fundamental role 
within a common law system, where its case law provides judicial 
understanding, as well as substantial changes to the understanding of 
constitutional principles, thereby establishing concrete rules governing 
specific circumstances311. Test cases that come before it influence the 
decisions of lower courts312. The specific features of the whole system is its 
flexibility and ability to offer more opportunities than the Italian civil law 
system for judicial review: the “decentralized judicial review” means that 
all levels of the judiciary are provided with “room for judicial construction 
of constitutional meaning” and have opportunities to “fill the gaps” in the 
constitutional framework313. 
The highest judicial board has traditionally represented the 
compass of the “tension” between the two religious clauses, which 
“paradoxically” guaranteed their “mutual strengthening”314. Furthermore, 
                                                             
309 See G. CASUSCELLI, “Volendo togliere ogni dubbio …”, cit., pp. 264-269. See also 
Constitutional Court, No. 63/2016. 
310 See J. PASQUALI CERIOLI, Una proposta di svolta, in R. ZACCARIA, S. DOMIANELLO, 
A. FERRARI, P. FLORIS, R. MAZZOLA (eds.), La legge che non c’è, cit., p. 351. 
311 See A. MADERA, Nuove forme di obiezione di coscienza, cit., p. 4, and its 
bibliographical references. 
312 See A. MADERA, Nuove forme di obiezione di coscienza, cit., p. 4, and its 
bibliographical references. 
313 See L. HUNT GREENHAW, M.H. KOBY, Constitutional Conversations, cit., pp. 671-
672. 
314 See A. MADERA, “Dealing with Atheism: una lettura alternativa dei rapporti fra Stato 
e Confessioni nell’ordinamento statunitense”, in Quaderni di Diritto e Politica Ecclesiastica 
3/2013, pp. 865, and its bibliographical references; A. BROWNSTEIN Attempting to 
Engage in Socially Coherent Dialogue about Religious Liberty and Equality, in UC Davis Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series, 2018, p. 9. 
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it “expanded the reach of constitutional law” and exercised a critical 
review of the actions of other branches of federal and, in particular, state 
governments, making large use of the “incorporation doctrine” and 
playing the role of “vigilant protector” of “personal liberties”315. In 
relation to the free exercise clause, the Supreme Court articulated a clear 
distinction between “mandatory accommodations” (which are compelled 
under the free exercise clause) and “discretionary accommodations” 
(which have often been restrained in light of the establishment clause)316, 
and guaranteed religious minorities the role of “active participants” in the 
“constitutional conversation”, which is grounded on the free exercise 
clause, and made room for the narratives of those communities317. The on-
going dialogue between the Supreme Court and the lower courts plays a 
key role in the evolutive processes of the meaning of the constitutional 
text. However, after Smith, the free exercise clause lost its central role as 
bastion of protection of religious freedom. The Supreme Court was 
traditionally interventionist within a separationist understanding of 
church-state relationships; but, since 2004, a reversal of this trend can be 
noted, as more “conservative” attitude toward legislative choices has 
developed318. The Supreme Court adopted a self-restraint, an almost 
“deferential” approach toward state legislative choices about religious 
freedom, indirectly supporting a fragmented system of religious 
exemptions recognized at the state level319. The pandemic crisis 
emphasized the need for the Supreme Court to take back its role as the 
“paramount voice” in the “constitutional conversation” about religious 
freedom while it is still able, as its most recent intervention in the field of 
religious freedom shows, to have a significant impact on the “meaning of 
the constitutional text”320. Its so far brief intervention into the question of 
religious freedom in the context of the pandemic shows, on one hand, its 
crucial role as guardian of the correct balance between competing interest, 
in view of the obligation of the lower courts to follow Supreme Court 
precedents. On the other hand, its current split shows the difficulty of 
                                                             
315 See L. HUNT GREENHAW, M.H. KOBY, Constitutional Conversations, cit., p. 619 
and p. 641. 
316 See S.H. BARCLAY, First Amendment “Harms”, cit., 340. 
317 See L. HUNT GREENHAW, M.H. KOBY, Constitutional Conversations, cit., p. 634. 
318 See E.G. QUILLEN, Atheist Exceptionalism: Atheism, Religion and the United States 
Supreme Court, Routledge, New York, 2018, p. 106 ff.; See A. MADERA, “Dealing with 
Atheism, cit., p. 861, and its bibliographical references. 
319 See A. MADERA, Nuove forme di obiezione di coscienza, cit., p. 3, and its 
bibliographical references. 
320 See L. HUNT GREENHAW, M.H. KOBY, Constitutional Conversations, cit., pp. 628. 
 
131 
Rivista telematica (https://www.statoechiese.it), fascicolo n. 16 del 2020               ISSN 1971- 8543 
reaching proper balances, and the high risk of an increasingly 
conservative mindset, depending on personal inclinations of individual 
judges.  
The crucial question is whether, in the near future, the Court will 
move toward a “more generous interpretation” of the free exercise 
clause321, as some justices are indirectly showing their dissatisfaction with 
the current interpretation of the constitutional framework322. In any event, 
the Supreme Court justices should remember that “the religious liberty 
rights they create will not necessarily be confined to the religions and 
causes they favor”323. 
 
 
17 - Enhanced need to balance the exercise of religious freedom with 
third-party harm during a pandemic 
 
In both legal systems, the current pandemic crisis shows that religious 
freedom cannot have absolute protection, cannot be considered immune to 
legislative supervision, and has to be reconciled with other compelling 
and pressing needs; and, surely, public health and safety can be included 
in those compelling and pressing needs. In both countries the pandemic 
situation offers the opportunity to think about the increasing concern over 
the negative impact, namely the “cost”, of the exercise of religious 
freedom on civil society. Indeed, the analysis of third-party burdens is 
progressively becoming a crucial element in the difficult balance between 
state interests and demands for religious accommodation, which judicial 
review has been increasingly taken into consideration324.  
On both sides of the ocean the pandemic has emphasized the 
critical question of whether and to what extent religious liberty can 
                                                             
321 See D.O. CONKLE, Congressional Alternatives, cit., p. 685. 
322 In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 586 U.S. _ (2019), a case raised by a high 
school football coach who was subject to suspension for guiding students in prayers 
before and after games, the Court denied the writ of certiorari. However, four justices 
released a statement on the Court’s ruling, concluding that “Petitioner’s decision to rely 
primarily on his free speech claims as opposed to these alternative claims may be due to 
certain decisions of this Court. In Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. 
Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), the Court drastically cut back on the protection provided by 
the free exercise clause, and in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63 (1977), 
the Court opined that Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of religion 
does not require an employer to make any accommodation that imposes more than a de 
minimis burden. In this case, however, we have not been asked to revisit those decisions”. 
323 See C.M. CORBIN, A Religious Right, cit. 
324 See A. MADERA, Nuove forme di obiezione di coscienza, cit., p. 27. 
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impose “costs of observing one’s religion on someone else” where that 
someone else does not receive any advantage from religious 
accommodation325. 
Both European and U.S. case law about religious freedom provides 
a wide range of different features of harm (level of seriousness, “direct” or 
“indirect” nature, “intended” or “unintended” harm, an so on), that can 
justify different judicial responses, ranging from complete lack of religious 
accommodation to the possibility of reconciling competing interests326. 
However, where important community interests are at stake (public 
health, public welfare), or the request for accommodation comes from a 
public servant, judicial responses should be influenced by the availability 
or the lack327 of social safety measures that seek to balance access to 
fundamental services and claims of religious freedom, so as to prevent the 
risks of undermining government ability to pursue public aims328. The 
ECHR (more than the U.S. Supreme Court) showed special solicitude to a 
vital factor for accommodation: whether or not public policies can provide 
a secular alternative to guarantee that the fundamental service at stake is 
available for the community329.  
Although there are accommodations that could “obstruct the 
achievement of major social goals”330, or disproportionately burden some 
classes of individuals, there are also accommodations where the costs are 
“minimal” and “widely shared”331 (or, according to some academics, that 
cause the same harm as is permitted for secular activities)332; so a crucial 
                                                             
325 See F.M. GEDICKS, A. KOPPELMAN, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for 
Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, in Vand. L. Rev. En Banc, vol. 67, 2014, 
p. 51. 
326 See S.H. BARCLAY, First Amendment “Harms”, cit., pp. 337-338. 
327 As an example, in the United States the phenomenon of religious organizations 
operating as social services and healthcare providers has often raised the question of who 
is charged to provide those services, to which religious institutions object, in an 
environment highly governed by market rules and with scarce public supervision. 
328 See A. MADERA, Nuove forme di obiezione di coscienza, cit., p. 29. 
329 See ECHR, Section III, October 2 2001, Pichon et Sajous c. France (application n. 
49853/99); A. MADERA, Nuove forme di obiezione di coscienza, cit., p. 32. 
330 See D. NEJAIME, R. SIEGEL, Conscience Wars in Transnational Perspective: Religious 
Liberty, Third-Party Harm, and Pluralism, in S. MANCINI, M. ROSENFELD (eds.), The 
Conscience Wars: Rethinking The Balance Between Religion, Identity, and Equality, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2018, pp. 199-200. 
331 See D. NEJAIME, R. SIEGEL, Religious Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, in Yale L. J. F., vol. 128, 2018, p. 201.  
332 See S.H. BARCLAY, First Amendment “Harms”, cit., p. 353. 
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factor is whether the costs of religious liberty are spread across the whole 
civil community or whether the costs of religious accommodation burden 
specific vulnerable classes of individuals333. It has also to be taken into 
consideration that “[c]ertain kinds of externalities are both difficult to see 
and difficult to measure, usually because they involve increased risk 
rather than an immediately discernible, concrete effect”334. Furthermore, 
different legal environments can justify different legal response; for 
example, the unique character of the prison context (low budgets and 
prisoners depending on public officials to exercise their rights), or the 
workplace, where, traditionally, in both Europe and the United States a 
low threshold of accommodation is considered acceptable, or the 
educational context, where courts have often given precedence to the high 
risk of “religious indoctrination” over claims for religious 
accommodation335. Recently, in both Europe and the United States, 
antidiscrimination law emphasized the increasing tension between 
religious exemptions and claims for equal protection and 
nondiscrimination in the field of LGBT rights336. In the U.S. context, 
academics have increasingly emphasized the relevance of “dignitary 
harms” to those who “do not share the [religious] claimant’s belief” 337 and 
perceive as “offensive” and “hurtful” the refusal of a service, “particularly 
when it involves goods or services related to one’s identity and significant 
personal life”338. In the European scenario, the principle of non-
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discrimination often has a prevailing role in judicial decisions and it can 
justify restrictions on religious freedom, while its sacrifice in front of 
religious grounds would require “very weighty reasons”339. 
The increasing weight of third-party harms in both European and 
U.S. cases is likely to have an expanding impact on judicial choices about 
religious accommodation.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has traditionally relied on the idea of 
reasonableness of accommodation. However, in recent cases, an over-
expansive protection guaranteed to forms of “corporate conscience”340, 
resulted in limited consideration of the possible “least restrictive 
alternative” that would provide a fairer distribution of social costs of 
rights protected under the First Amendment341. This protection, which 
indirectly favors majority narratives, risks leading to the dismantling of an 
already frail balance between general rules and religious exemptions. 
The ECHR approach (which should be a guideline for national 
choices) emphasized that religious freedom is subject to those limits that 
are “necessary in a democratic society” to safeguard the “liberties and 
rights of the others” and underlined “positive obligations” upon States to 
reduce social conflicts342. Claims for accommodation of the right to 
manifest one’s religious observance always include an analysis of 
proportionality, which takes into serious consideration not only the 
impact of religious accommodation on third parties (specifically minority 
or vulnerable categories), but also the preservation of the values of the 
democratic and religiously neutral legal system involved (in the light of 
the margin of appreciation)343. However, in the European context, the 
transition from a severe analysis of specific facts, legal contexts, and 
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material and concrete injuries “for the rights and freedom of the others”, 
to the enhancement of abstract principles (the “living together”) with a 
dangerous over-expansion of the protection of the rights and freedom of 
the others, which are dangerously identified with the majority views, to 
the detriment of uncommon disliked religious minorities, need to be 
carefully monitored344. 
This article’s comparative perspective shows that courts may 
balance parties’ rights, and sometimes a certain amount of third-party 
harm is acceptable in the protection of religious rights, or to reach a wider 
social benefit. Courts also need to balance the competing sacrifices that 
stem from the protection of religious rights345. However, both an abstract 
and decontextualized concern about “the rights and liberties of others”, as 
well as the underestimation of the third-party burdens, can have a 
detrimental impact on the protection of religious freedom in the long term. 
An assimilation of different situations should be avoided. An undue 
equalization of all situations could lead to paradoxical “over-inclusive” 
(the removal of all religious exemptions, even those enjoyed by religious 
minorities) or “under-inclusive” results (underestimation in the cost 
benefits analysis of the harms that would burden vulnerable classes of 
individuals served or employed by religious institutions that operate by 
virtue of a religious exemption granted by state law, and understatement 
of the general benefits coming from the reduction of social conflicts)346.  
However, as noticed by academics, a pandemic emergency does 
lead to an ordinary collision between two competing interests, as it is a 
genuine, extremely serious and imminent threat to public health and 
safety347. In both legal systems, the aim of restrictions on religious freedom 
was not to discriminate or prosecute religion, but was the unavoidable 
result of a “democratic harmonization” of several rights348. Religious 
restrictions should not be considered “uniquely pervasive”, on the 
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contrary, they require an understanding, in the global context, of 
limitations on the rights of assembly because of COVID-19349. 
Crucial decisions have not been taken autonomously by executive 
powers but have been subject to the extraordinary process of the 
“medicalization” of law, which speeds the decision-making process more 
widely that merely judicially. An exceptionally cautious approach is, 
therefore, recommended to prevent any serious negative impact of 
religious choices on “third parties” (using U.S. judicial language) and on 
“rights and freedoms of others” (Art. 9.2, ECHR). During phase one of the 
pandemic, autonomous religious choices could not receive priority 
protection if there existed an alternative way of exercising the right to 
religious worship. In both countries, specific cautionary measures are still 
in force about social situations, particularly in relation to indoor spaces, 
close proximity, longer times of assembly, practices and rituals that 
increase danger. A careful negotiation between all the parties involved in 
making decisions about health safety makes it easier to overcome critical 
aspects of the collective exercise of religious freedom, as occurred in Italy 
in phase two. Otherwise an absence of dialogue can lead to the judiciary 
reacting to the situation and restricting both religious and secular 
assembly (as the U.S. Supreme Court did). It should be noted that that in 
the United States the claim in front of the Supreme Court did not concern 
a complete banning of religious services but was a request for injunctive 
relief against guidelines that allow religious gatherings with precautionary 
measures, where the appropriateness of the guidelines to the specific 
context of religious gatherings is the object of dispute. The crucial question 
is whether and to what degree it is acceptable and reasonable to impose a 
risk on third parties while satisfying a “basic need of the person”350. The 
answer is influenced by the stage of the health crisis in different 
geographical areas, all of which have different levels of COVID-19 
infection, and risk of the increased transmission of the virus351. So the 
severity and extent of the health crisis is a crucial factor to define the terms 
of the restrictions, as it is what leads to the need for restrictions. 
However, it has been authoritatively argued that the “long-term 
viability” of a “genuinely democratic system” is strictly connected with its 
“resilience”, namely its ability to find the correct balance between 
ordinary rules and “acceptable deviations”, which have to be incorporated 
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into a framework of “established guarantees” and leave little space for 
“improvisations”352. Therefore, emergency limitations are not an 
“autonomous source of law”, but a “circumstance that has to be governed 
by law”, even though with “exceptions” and “flexible” regulations; this 
factor marks the threshold between “force majeure” and “arbitrary 
discretion”353. 
In both legal systems, during the crucial phase two, the resolution 
of conflicts about religious worship will require a careful balance of means 
used and pursued purposes, because of the need to The “necessity” and 
the “proportionality” of the renunciations demanded of all the parties 
involved have to be carefully monitored, and limitations should be strictly 
connected to specific needs and temporal limits354. However, if phase two 
remains and we have to cope with the virus in the long term, the 
prerequisite of the extraordinary and temporary character of the measures 
will become increasingly weaker and new balances between competing 
interests will need to be found in order to reach a well-thought-out 
equilibrium across all the values at stake355, taking into account that 
religious freedom is at the core of the protection offered by international 
treaties, which should not allow deviations356; religious freedom cannot be 
marginalized, even in secular societies357. Some European courts that had 
to cope with these issues of religious freedom and the protection of public 
health followed the concept of reconciliation of competing interests, 
focusing on the standard of proportionality358.  
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18 - Impact of the pandemic on the exercise of religious freedom in the 
long term 
 
The all-important question is whether the pandemic will influence future 
political responses to religious freedom and whether legal systems will 
move toward a more considered implementation of religious pluralism, 
which would be consistent with their constitutional frameworks.  
Phase two can be used to revisit legal protection of religious 
freedom, which is continually evolving, mirroring social, political and 
cultural changes359, in pursuit of “building a society” able to face future 
crises without excessively limiting individual liberties360. 
In the United States there is a long tradition of religious 
accommodation, which is founded on a balancing process that takes into 
consideration the “complex nature of the interests involved”, the 
“difficulty of reconciling them in a multi-religious society”, and the 
existence of many “borderline situations”, which all lead to the “risk” of 
civil authorities intruding into “matters of ecclesiastical scope”361. The 
balancing test has enabled the filtering of demands for religious 
accommodation, as well as allowing vital management of the difficulties 
between majority and minority groups.  
The maintenance of a “deep” pluralism (which guarantees the 
accommodation of “deep diversity”)362 - the genuine distinctive feature of 
the American judicial mode - should be the preferred path, as well as the 
way to prevent forms of exploitation of the religious element. However, 
Judge Scalia’s fear of implementing “a system in which each conscience is 
a law unto itself”363 should also be taken into consideration in future 
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political and judicial choices about religious freedom, and specific 
attention be given to the risk of negative consequences for vulnerable 
categories of people364.  
The role and duties of all religious organizations that operate in 
civil society and their consistent mindfulness toward the most vulnerable 
individuals, even during the current health crisis, cannot be 
underestimated. However, their role should also include a more 
“responsible” use of the freedom guaranteed by a constitutional 
framework365, in terms of cooperation with civil authorities to facilitate the 
implementation of measures aimed at preventing the disease from 
infecting more people366. For this reason, religious communities are 
charged with the duty of observing a course of conduct that does not 
negatively affect the rights of others, even though faith needs cannot be 
discriminated against by uncontrolled discretionary state restrictions367. 
In Italy, the constitutional framework provides all the necessary 
equipment to deal with critical situations; flexible readings of the 
Constitution, depending on different circumstances and contexts, are 
consistent with constitutional guarantees368.  
In the second stage, at least, the Italian “constitutional apparatus 
should also provide ‘more space’ for the strategic development of a 
‘common language’ and ‘shared responses’”369. However the linguistic 
register of cooperation should be revised, to imply not only a “bilateral”, 
but also an effective “multiparty” dialogue, so as to be consistent with our 
system of values, which is founded on pluralism and democracy, in the 
pursuit of a genuine “material and spiritual advancement of society” and 
“loyal cooperation” between the State and all religious groups370.  
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The pandemic experience offers a special opportunity to reconsider 
the importance of a model of pluralism founded on inclusivity and 
participation - even though the concrete ways of implementing such 
religious dialogue need further investigation - in the pursuit of a more 
inclusive participation of all collective entities that want to offer their 
contribution and commitment to dialogue and cooperation371. 
In both legal systems, a regime founded on democracy, State 
neutrality, and religious pluralism is consistent with the recognition of 
forms of religious accommodation aimed at implementing a “social order” 
where different systems of values can harmoniously “coexist”372. Indeed, 
whether a pluralist regime is genuinely pluralist is closely connected to its 
ability to guarantee the “maximum protection of the competing rights”, 
which requires “promoting and balancing interventions” that aim to 
prevent both the implementation of strictly separationist models (which 
would discourage active participation of religious organizations “in the 
pursuit of shared goals”), and at the same time “mitigating regressive 
modalities of the exercise of religious freedom”, which negatively affect 
and hinder the integration of those who do not share the same system of 
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